LEADER 03475nam 2200553 450 001 9910824068303321 005 20191127084542.0 010 $a1-5017-2025-2 024 7 $a10.7591/9781501720253 035 $a(CKB)4100000008039737 035 $a(DE-B1597)534012 035 $a(OCoLC)1121053917 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781501720253 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5965074 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5965074 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000008039737 100 $a20191127d2004 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBalancing risks $egreat power intervention in th periphery /$fJeffrey W. Taliaferro 210 1$aIthaca, New York ;$aLondon :$cCornell University Press,$d[2004] 210 4$dİ2004 215 $a1 online resource (329 pages) 225 1 $aCornell studies in security affairs 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a1-5017-2026-0 311 $a0-8014-4221-4 327 $tFront matter --$tCONTENTS --$tTables and Figures --$tAcknowledgments --$tAbbreviations --$tNote on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions --$t1. Power Politics and the Balance of Risk --$t2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery --$t3. Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis --$t4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions --$t5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) --$t6. The Limits of Great Power Intervention in the Periphery --$t7. Implications of the Argument --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aGreat powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts? Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism. Taliaferro constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States' involvement in the Korean War in 1950-52, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937-40 and its decisions for war with the U.S. in 1940-41. 410 0$aCornell studies in security affairs. 606 $aWorld politics$y20th century 607 $aGreat Britain$xForeign relations$y1901-1910 607 $aJapan$xForeign relations$y1912-1945 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1945-1953 615 0$aWorld politics 676 $a909.82 686 $a15.59$2bcl 686 $a89.79$2bcl 700 $aTaliaferro$b Jeffrey W.$01642413 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910824068303321 996 $aBalancing risks$93987106 997 $aUNINA