LEADER 05637nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910824006503321 005 20240516164356.0 010 $a1-280-66984-5 010 $a9786613646774 010 $a981-4383-04-X 035 $a(CKB)2550000000101766 035 $a(EBL)919153 035 $a(OCoLC)794306960 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000659639 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12241195 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000659639 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10697981 035 $a(PQKB)10945416 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC919153 035 $a(WSP)00002714 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL919153 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10563543 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL364677 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000101766 100 $a20120216d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurbuu|||uu||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 04$aThe world economy after the global crisis $ea new economic order for the 21st century /$feditors, Barry Eichengreen, Bokyeong Park 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aHackensack, N.J. $cWorld Scientific Pub.$dc2012 215 $a1 online resource (230 p.) 225 1 $aWorld Scientific studies in international economics,$x1793-3641 ;$vv. 19 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a981-4383-03-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aContents; Contributors; Chapter 1. Introduction; Chapter 2. Financial Reform after the Crisis; 1 Introduction; 2 The Dynamics of Financial Reform; 2.1 The G20; 2.2 The IMF and the FSB; 2.3 Individual jurisdictions; 2.4 Crisis-induced shifts; 3 Challenges and Outlook; 3.1 Ongoing crisis management; 3.2 Macroprudential approaches; 3.3 Regulating multinational financial firms; 3.4 Consistent implementation of global standards; 3.5 Financial systems and growth; References; Chapter 3. Did WTO Rules Restrain Protectionism During the Recent Systemic Crisis?; 1 Introduction 327 $a2 Twenty-First Century Protectionism During a Systemic Financial Crisis: Some Preliminary Considerations 3 The Resort to Discrimination Against Foreign Commercial Interests Since the First Crisis-Era G20 Summit in November 2008; 4 An Assessment of the Impact of WTO Rules During the Recent Systemic Crisis; 5 Concluding Remarks; Appendix: Estimates of Total Trade Covered by Jumbo Measures; References; Chapter 4. The International Monetary System after the Financial Crisis; 1 The Global Reserve System; 2 The Emergency Provision of Liquidity; 3 Regulating Capital Flows; 4 The Role of the IMF 327 $a5 Conclusion References; Chapter 5. The Group of 20: Trials of Global Governance in Times of Crisis; 1 Benefits from International Coordination: Reviewing the Arguments; 2 A Narrative of the G20 in Times of Crisis; 2.1 Washington (November 2008); 2.2 London (April 2009); 2.3 Pittsburgh (September 2009); 2.4 Toronto and Seoul (June and November 2010); 2.5 Cannes (November 2011); 3 Scoreboards of Success; 4 Taking Stock and Looking Forward; References; Chapter 6. Emerging Markets in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction; 2 Rising Prominence of EMEs 327 $a3 The Distribution of World Growth 4 What Explains the Resilience of Emerging Markets?; 5 Global Public Debt and Implications for the Growth Gap; 6 Risks; 7 Concluding Remarks; References; Chapter 7. Challenges for Emerging Asia; 1 Introduction: Asia's Recovery from the Global Financial Crisis; 2 Transition from Exports to Domestic Demand; 3 Killing the Inflation Dragon; 4 Risk of the Middle Income Trap; 5 The Rise of China and the Future of Regional Cooperation; 6 Conclusion; References; Chapter 8. Long-Term Challenges for the Advanced Economies: Reducing Government Debt; 1 Introduction 327 $a2 Projected Paths of Government Debt 2.1 General government primary balances; 2.2 Size of economies (GDP); 2.3 Interest rates; 2.4 Baseline debt projections; 2.5 The optimistic and pessimistic health care cost scenarios; 2.6 Two interest rate scenarios; 2.7 The optimistic growth scenario; 2.8 The pessimistic growth scenario; 2.9 Implications of net debt projections; 3 The Burden of Debt and Fiscal Limits; 3.1 Effect of debt on interest rates and interest payments; 3.2 The limits of debt; 3.3 Fiscal crises; 4 Paths to Safety; 4.1 Gradual (early) adjustment; 4.2 Abrupt (delayed) adjustment 327 $a4.3 Benefits of early and gradual adjustment 330 $aThe global credit crisis of 2008-2009 was the most serious shock to the world economy in fully 80 years. It was for the world as a whole what the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 was for emerging markets: a profoundly alarming wake-up call. By laying bare the fragility of global markets, it raised troubling questions about the operation of our deeply integrated world economy. It cast doubt on the efficacy of the dominant mode of light-touch financial regulation and more generally on the efficacy of the prevailing commitment to economic and financial liberalization. It challenged the managerial capacity 410 0$aWorld Scientific studies in international economics ;$vv. 19. 606 $aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 606 $aEconomic history$y21st century 615 0$aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. 615 0$aEconomic history 676 $a330.9 701 $aEichengreen$b Barry J$0318418 701 $aPak$b Pog-yo?ng$01611840 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910824006503321 996 $aThe world economy after the global crisis$93940290 997 $aUNINA