LEADER 03511nam 2200661Ia 450 001 9910823406003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4755-1485-9 010 $a1-4755-2046-8 035 $a(CKB)2550000001041570 035 $a(EBL)1607098 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000946243 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11515562 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000946243 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10893405 035 $a(PQKB)10295955 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1607098 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10661261 035 $a(OCoLC)870245113 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2012289 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2012289 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607098 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001041570 100 $a20121218d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCoordinating climate and trade policies $ePareto efficiency and the role of border tax adjustments /$fprepared by Michael Keen and Christos Kotsogiannis 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aWashington, D.C. $cInternational Monetary Fund$dc2012 215 $a1 online resource (27 p.) 225 0 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/12/289 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4755-6036-2 311 $a1-4755-5294-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Modeling Climate and Trade Policies; III. The Benchmark: Unconstrained Carbon Tax and Tariff Policies; IV. Pareto Efficiency and the Role of Border Tax Adjustments; A. Border Tax Adjustments in the Absence of Distributional Concerns; B. Border Tax Adjustments in the General Case; V. Further Discussion; A. Comparison with Non-cooperative Policies; B. Border Tax Adjustment and Cap-and-Trade; VI. Concluding Remarks; Appendices; A. Necessary Conditions for Pareto Efficiency; B. Proof of Proposition 1; C. Proof of Proposition 2; D. Proof of Proposition 5 327 $aReferences 330 3 $aThis paper explores the role of trade instruments in globally efficient climate policies, focusing on the central issue of whether some form of border tax adjustment (BTA) is warranted when carbon prices differ internationally. It shows that tariff policy has a role in easing cross-country distributional concerns that can make non-uniform carbon pricing efficient and, more particularly, that Pareto-efficiency requires a form of BTA when carbon taxes in some countries are constrained, a special case being identified in which this has the simple structure envisaged in practical policy discusions. It also stresses?a point that has been overlooked in the policy debate?that the efficiency case for BTA depends critically on whether climate policies are pursued by carbon taxation or by cap-and-trade. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2012/289 606 $aClimatic changes$xGovernment policy 606 $aCommercial policy$xEnvironmental aspects 606 $aTaxation$xEnvironmental aspects 615 0$aClimatic changes$xGovernment policy. 615 0$aCommercial policy$xEnvironmental aspects. 615 0$aTaxation$xEnvironmental aspects. 676 $a332.1532 700 $aKeen$b Michael$0125941 701 $aKotsogiannis$b Christos$01658103 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910823406003321 996 $aCoordinating Climate and Trade Policies$94011911 997 $aUNINA