LEADER 03954nam 2200697 a 450 001 9910823367303321 005 20230725023915.0 010 $a1-282-64510-2 010 $a9786612645105 010 $a1-4008-3678-6 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400836789 035 $a(CKB)2670000000034547 035 $a(EBL)548755 035 $a(OCoLC)650875707 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000422192 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11310324 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000422192 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10416119 035 $a(PQKB)10065932 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC548755 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36825 035 $a(DE-B1597)446815 035 $a(OCoLC)979582208 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400836789 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL548755 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10397713 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL264510 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000034547 100 $a20100426d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|||||||nn|n 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe litigation state $epublic regulation and private lawsuits in the U.S. /$fSean Farhang 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$d2010 215 $a1 online resource (321 p.) 225 1 $aPrinceton studies in American politics : historical, international, and comparative perspectives 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-14381-1 311 $a0-691-14382-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $apt. 1. Private enforcement regimes in general -- pt. 2. Enforcement regimes and civil rights. 330 $aOf the 1.65 million lawsuits enforcing federal laws over the past decade, 3 percent were prosecuted by the federal government, while 97 percent were litigated by private parties. When and why did private plaintiff-driven litigation become a dominant model for enforcing federal regulation? The Litigation State shows how government legislation created the nation's reliance upon private litigation, and investigates why Congress would choose to mobilize, through statutory design, private lawsuits to implement federal statutes. Sean Farhang argues that Congress deliberately cultivates such private lawsuits partly as a means of enforcing its will over the resistance of opposing presidents. Farhang reveals that private lawsuits, functioning as an enforcement resource, are a profoundly important component of American state capacity. He demonstrates how the distinctive institutional structure of the American state--particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy--encourages Congress to incentivize private lawsuits. Congress thereby achieves regulatory aims through a decentralized army of private lawyers, rather than by well-staffed bureaucracies under the president's influence. The historical development of ideological polarization between Congress and the president since the late 1960's has been a powerful cause of the explosion of private lawsuits enforcing federal law over the same period. Using data from many policy areas spanning the twentieth century, and historical analysis focused on civil rights, The Litigation State investigates how American political institutions shape the strategic design of legislation to mobilize private lawsuits for policy implementation. 410 0$aPrinceton studies in American politics. 606 $aCivil procedure$zUnited States 606 $aFederal government$zUnited States 606 $aActions and defenses$zUnited States 615 0$aCivil procedure 615 0$aFederal government 615 0$aActions and defenses 676 $a347.7/305 700 $aFarhang$b Sean$01636367 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910823367303321 996 $aThe litigation state$93977600 997 $aUNINA