LEADER 04084nam 2200529 450 001 9910823277903321 005 20230817185536.0 010 $a981-4881-20-1 024 7 $a10.1355/9789814881203 035 $a(CKB)4940000000148591 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9789814881203 035 $a(OCoLC)1136273957 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse82711 035 $a(DE-B1597)544483 035 $a(OCoLC)1129204481 035 $a(DE-B1597)9789814881203 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5984424 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5984424 035 $a(EXLCZ)994940000000148591 100 $a20220523d2019 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aChina's evolving policy towards the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia (1949-2018) /$fXiao An Wu 210 1$aSingapore :$cISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute,$d[2019] 210 4$dİ2019 215 $a1 online resource (25 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aTrends in Southeast Asia ;$vNumber 14 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 27 Jan 2020). 311 0 $a981-4881-19-8 327 $tFront matter --$tFOREWORD --$tChina's Evolving Policy towards the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia (1949-2018) --$tChina's Evolving Policy towards the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia (1949-2018). Introduction 330 $aThe Chinese diaspora, consisting of both Chinese living overseas who are citizens of China (huaqiao), and people of Chinese descent who are citizens of foreign countries (huaren), have significantly shaped the making of modern China. China's policy towards its diaspora is primarily governed by its national interests and foreign policy imperatives. However, the Chinese government has been careful to ensure that the huaqiao and the huaren fall into different policy domains: Chinese citizens living overseas are subject to China's domestic policies, while Chinese descendants who are citizens of other countries come under China's foreign affairs. Nevertheless, from the beginning, the latter continue to be regarded as kinsfolk distinct from other foreign nationals. The huaqiao-huaren distinction is often blurred in ordinary discourse and this has been a source of much misunderstanding. However, it has not been the policy of the Chinese government to blur this distinction, and it is acutely aware of the complexity of the issue and is therefore very cautious about implying any change. As such, when terms such as huaqiao-huaren are introduced in the official lexicon, they are meant to acknowledge certain historical and contemporary realities, and not to deliberately obfuscate the two categories. The use of the combined term is in fact a recognition of the clear-cut distinction between the two groups, and is meant to convey a semantic balance in which neither category is emphasized at the expense of the other. In general, since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government has treated the diaspora as an asset, rather than a liability. The sole exception was during the Cultural Revolution when returnees, or the guiqiao, were condemned as reactionary and bourgeois elements. There is therefore a fundamental continuity in China's diaspora policy: namely, that China embraces both groups as part of a global Chinese community. Some policy shifts can be expected in future as China becomes more proactive in reaching out to its diaspora while balancing the needs and interests of Chinese abroad with the needs and interests of the Mainland. 410 0$aTrends in Southeast Asia ;$vNumber 14. 606 $aChinese diaspora 615 0$aChinese diaspora. 676 $a305.8951 700 $aWu$b Xiao An$f1965-$01678202 712 02$aISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910823277903321 996 $aChina's evolving policy towards the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia (1949-2018)$94045640 997 $aUNINA