LEADER 01043nam a22002651i 4500 001 991000638479707536 005 20040126194131.0 008 040220s1956 it |||||||||||||||||ita 035 $ab12647998-39ule_inst 035 $aARCHE-064634$9ExL 040 $aDip.to Scienze pedagogiche$bita$cA.t.i. Arché s.c.r.l. Pandora Sicilia s.r.l. 082 04$a371.42 100 1 $aBiot, Rene$0466301 245 10$aChe pensi di fare nella vita? :$bprincipi e metodi dell'orientamento scolastico e professionale /$cR. Biot, F.M. Dufour 260 $aMilano :$bVita e Pensiero,$c1956 300 $a304 p. ;$c20 cm 650 4$aOrientamento scolastico 650 4$aOrientamento professionale 700 1 $aDufour, François Maurice 907 $a.b12647998$b02-04-14$c17-03-04 912 $a991000638479707536 945 $aLE022 MP 65 C 26$g1$i2022000033985$lle022$o-$pE0.00$q-$rl$s- $t0$u2$v1$w2$x0$y.i13153134$z17-03-04 996 $aChe pensi di fare nella vita?$9275599 997 $aUNISALENTO 998 $ale022$b17-03-04$cm$da $e-$fita$git $h0$i1 LEADER 03049nam 2200589 450 001 9910822888203321 005 20201117192101.0 010 $a1-5017-5192-1 024 7 $a10.1515/9781501751936 035 $a(CKB)5590000000002801 035 $a(OCoLC)1140380459 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse85325 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6010763 035 $a(DE-B1597)545609 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781501751936 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0002535096 035 $a(OCoLC)1224278055 035 $a(EXLCZ)995590000000002801 100 $a20210416e20212020 fy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|||||||nn|n 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aHow to prevent coups d'e?tat $ecounterbalancing and regime survival /$fErica De Bruin$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aIthaca :$cCornell University Press,$d2021. 215 $a1 online resource (1 online resource) 225 1 $aCornell scholarship online 300 $aPreviously issued in print: 2020. 311 $a1-5017-5191-3 311 $a1-5017-5193-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction: Preventing Coups d'etat -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'etat Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival. 330 8 $aWhen rulers use presidential guards, militarized police, and militia to counterbalance the regular military, efforts to oust them from power via coups d'e?tat are less likely to succeed. Even as counterbalancing helps to prevent successful interventions, however, the resentment that it generates within the regular military can provoke new coup attempts. And because counterbalancing changes how soldiers and police perceive the costs and benefits of a successful overthrow, it can create incentives for protracted fighting that result in the escalation of a coup into full-blown civil war. Drawing on an original dataset of state security forces in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the book sheds light on how counterbalancing affects regime survival. 410 0$aCornell scholarship online. 606 $aCoups d'e?tat$xPrevention 606 $aCivil war$xPrevention 606 $aPolitical leadership 606 $aCivil-military relations 615 0$aCoups d'e?tat$xPrevention. 615 0$aCivil war$xPrevention. 615 0$aPolitical leadership. 615 0$aCivil-military relations. 676 $a327.112 686 $aMD 8600$2rvk 700 $aDe Bruin$b Erica$f1982-$01720886 801 0$bStDuBDS 801 1$bStDuBDS 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910822888203321 996 $aHow to prevent coups d'e?tat$94119957 997 $aUNINA