LEADER 04379nam 2200781 a 450 001 9910822860403321 005 20240430171349.0 010 $a1-281-99037-X 010 $a9786611990374 010 $a3-11-021013-4 024 7 $a10.1515/9783110210132 035 $a(CKB)1000000000697975 035 $a(EBL)429325 035 $a(OCoLC)467157614 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000233270 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11220582 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000233270 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10220256 035 $a(PQKB)11066434 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC429325 035 $a(DE-B1597)35392 035 $a(OCoLC)423751479 035 $a(OCoLC)775645471 035 $a(DE-B1597)9783110210132 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL429325 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10275886 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL199037 035 $a(PPN)159713048 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000697975 100 $a20090219d2008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aReal existence, ideal necessity $eKant's compromise, and the modalities without the compromise /$fRobert Greenberg 210 $aNew York $cBerlin $cWalter de Gruyter$dc2008 215 $a1 online resource (232 p.) 225 1 $aKantstudien. Erga?nzungshefte,$x0340-6059 ;$v157 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-11-020690-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [199]-201) and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tInhalt -- $tPreface -- $tChapter 1 - General Review -- $tPart I: Existence -- $tChapter 2 - How Our Knowledge Begins -- $tChapter 3 - A Criterion of Existence in General -- $tChapter 4 - Sensation and Existence -- $tChapter 5 - Presupposition and Existence -- $tPart II: Necessity -- $tChapter 6 - Kant's Referential Ambiguity -- $tChapter 7 - Kaplan's Referential Ambiguity -- $tChapter 8 - Kaplan's Interpretation Adapted to Kant -- $tChapter 9 - Geometry and Causality -- $tChapter 10 - Presupposition and Real Necessity -- $tChapter 11 - Derivations of the Real Modalities -- $tChapter 12 - Conclusion -- $t Backmatter 330 $aAnalytic philosophy has leveled many challenges to Kant's ascription of necessary properties and relations to objects in his Critique of Pure Reason. Some of these challenges can be answered, it is argued here, largely in terms of techniques belonging to analytic philosophy itself, in particular, to its philosophy of language. This Kantian response is the primary objective of this book. It takes the form of a compromise between the real existence of the objects that we can intuit and that get our knowledge started - dubbed initiators - and the ideality of the necessary properties and relations that Kant ascribes to our sensible representations of initiators, which he entitles appearances. Whereas the real existence of initiators is independent of us and our senses, the necessity of these properties and relations of appearances is due to their origins in the mind. The Kantian compromise between real existence and ideal necessity is formulated in terms of David Kaplan's interpretation of de re necessity in his article, "Quantifying In" - his response to Quine's concern that a commitment to such a necessity leads to an acceptance of an unwanted traditional Aristotelian essentialism. In addition, the book first abstracts and then departs from its interpretation of Kant to provide a realistic account of the relation between existence and de re necessity. 410 0$aKantstudien.$pErga?nzungshefte ;$v157. 606 $aModality (Logic) 606 $aModality (Logic)$xHistory$y18th century 606 $aKnowledge, Theory of$xHistory 606 $aNonclassical mathematical logic 610 $aExistence. 610 $aKant, Imanuel. 610 $aKnowledge. 610 $aLogic. 610 $aNecessity. 615 0$aModality (Logic) 615 0$aModality (Logic)$xHistory 615 0$aKnowledge, Theory of$xHistory. 615 0$aNonclassical mathematical logic. 676 $a121.092 676 $a121.092 700 $aGreenberg$b Robert$f1934-$01675081 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910822860403321 996 $aReal existence, ideal necessity$94069369 997 $aUNINA