LEADER 06016nam 2200769 a 450 001 9910822383703321 005 20240514064608.0 010 $a9786613432278 010 $a9781283432276 010 $a1283432277 010 $a9781118178591 010 $a1118178599 010 $a9781118178560 010 $a1118178564 010 $a9781118178577 010 $a1118178572 035 $a(CKB)2550000000079367 035 $a(EBL)817485 035 $a(OCoLC)773564695 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000592904 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11369544 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000592904 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10736797 035 $a(PQKB)11267508 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC817485 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL817485 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10575459 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL343227 035 $a(Perlego)1010584 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000079367 100 $a20110808d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aRecognizing catastrophic incident warning signs in the process industries /$fCenter for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aHoboken, N.J. $cJohn Wiley & Sons$dc2012 215 $a1 online resource (259 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 08$a9780470767740 311 08$a047076774X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aRecognizing Catastropic Incident Warning Signs in the Process Industries; CONTENTS; List of Tables; List of Figures; Files on the Web Accompanying This Book; Acknowledgments; Foreword; Preface; 1 INTRODUCTION; 1.1 Process safety management; 1.1.1 Identifying process safety management system deficiencies; 1.2 Normalization of deviance; 1.3 A strategy for response; 1.4 Maintaining organizational memory and a healthy sense of vulnerability; 1.5 Risk Based Process Safety; 1.6 Our target audience; 1.7 How to use this book; 1.8 Case study - Toxic gas release in India; 2 INCIDENT MECHANICS 327 $a2.1 Incidents do not just happen2.2 Incident models; 2.2.1 The difference between incidents and catastrophic incidents; 2.2.2 The Swiss cheese incident model; 2.2.3 The bonfire incident analogy; 2.2.4 The dam incident analogy; 2.2.5 The iceberg incident analogy; 2.2.6 Incident trends and statistics; 2.2.7 Root cause analysis; 2.2.8 Multiple root cause theory; 2.3 Case study - Benzene plant explosion in China; 3 LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE; 3.1 How does leadership affect culture?; 3.1.1 Communication; 3.1.2 Operational discipline; 3.1.3 Process safety culture 327 $a3.1.4 Process safety versus occupational safety3.2 The leadership and culture related warning signs; 3.2.1 Operating outside the safe operating envelope is accepted; 3.2.2 Job roles and responsibilities not well defined, confusing, or unclear; 3.2.3 Negative external complaints; 3.2.4 Signs of worker fatigue; 3.2.5 Widespread confusion between occupational safety and process safety; 3.2.6 Frequent organizational changes; 3.2.7 Conflict between production goals and safety goals; 3.2.8 Process safety budget reduced; 3.2.9 Strained communications between management and workers 327 $a3.2.10 Overdue process safety action items3.2.11 Slow management response to process safety concerns; 3.2.12 A perception that management does not listen; 3.2.13 A lack of trust in field supervision; 3.2.14 Employee opinion surveys give negative feedback; 3.2.15 Leadership behavior implies that public reputation is more important than process safety; 3.2.16 Conflicting job priorities; 3.2.17 Everyone is too busy; 3.2.18 Frequent changes in priorities; 3.2.19 Conflict between workers and management concerning working conditions 327 $a3.2.20 Leaders obviously value activity-based behavior over outcome-based behavior3.2.21 Inappropriate supervisory behavior; 3.2.22 Supervisors and leaders not formally prepared for management roles; 3.2.23 A poorly defined chain of command; 3.2.24 Workers not aware of or not committed to standards; 3.2.25 Favoritism exists in the organization; 3.2.26 A high absenteeism rate; 3.2.27 An employee turnover issue exists; 3.2.28 Varying shift team operating practices and protocols; 3.2.29 Frequent changes in ownership; 3.3 Case study - Challenger space shuttle explosion in the United States 327 $a4 TRAINING AND COMPETENCY 330 $a"This book provides guidance on characterizing, recognizing, and responding to warning signs to help avoid process incidents and injuries before they occur. The guidance can be used by both process safety management (PSM) professionals in evaluating their processes and PSM systems as well as for operators who are often the frontline defense against process incidents. Warning signs may consist of process deviations or upsets, instrumentation warnings or alarms, past operating history and incidents, observable problems such as corrosion or unusual odors, audit results indicating procedures are not being followed, or a number of other indicators. Filled with photos and practical tips, this book will turn anyone in a process plant into a hazard lookout and will help prevent potential incidents before they turn into catastrophic events"--$cProvided by publisher. 606 $aChemical engineering$xSafety measures 606 $aChemicals$xAccidents$xPrevention 606 $aWarnings 615 0$aChemical engineering$xSafety measures. 615 0$aChemicals$xAccidents$xPrevention. 615 0$aWarnings. 676 $a660/.2804 686 $aTEC009010$2bisacsh 712 02$aAmerican Institute of Chemical Engineers.$bCenter for Chemical Process Safety. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910822383703321 996 $aRecognizing catastrophic incident warning signs in the process industries$94034148 997 $aUNINA