LEADER 04119nam 2200661 450 001 9910822149103321 005 20230808194051.0 010 $a1-5017-0382-X 010 $a1-5017-0383-8 024 7 $a10.7591/9781501703836 035 $a(CKB)3710000000745609 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001693587 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16546814 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001693587 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14911222 035 $a(PQKB)25092058 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4586000 035 $a(OCoLC)953459122 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58538 035 $a(DE-B1597)496417 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781501703836 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4586000 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11234908 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL951826 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000745609 100 $a20160803h20162016 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe statebuilder's dilemma $eon the limits of foreign intervention /$fDavid A. Lake 210 1$aIthaca, New York ;$aLondon, [England] :$cCornell University Press,$d2016. 210 4$dİ2016 215 $a1 online resource (254 pages) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-5017-0446-X 311 $a1-5017-0030-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tIntroduction -- $t1. Building Legitimate States -- $t2. Problems of Sovereignty -- $t3. Legitimacy and Loyalty -- $t4. Statebuilding in Iraq -- $t5. Statebuilding in Somalia -- $tConclusion -- $tReferences -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIndex 330 $aThe central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. This is a necessary condition for stable, effective governance. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. In The Statebuilder's Dilemma, David A. Lake addresses the key tradeoff between legitimacy and loyalty common to all international statebuilding attempts. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader's legitimacy at home.In Iraq, thrust into a statebuilding role it neither anticipated nor wanted, the United States eventually backed Nouri al-Malaki as the most favorable of a bad lot of alternative leaders. Malaki then used the support of the Bush administration to govern as a Shiite partisan, undermining the statebuilding effort and ultimately leading to the second failure of the Iraqi state in 2014. Ethiopia faced the same tradeoff in Somalia after the rise of a promising but irredentist government in 2006, invading to put its own puppet in power in Mogadishu. But the resulting government has not been able to build significant local support and legitimacy. Lake uses these cases to demonstrate that the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own. 606 $aNation-building 606 $aInternational relations 607 $aIraq$xPolitics and government$y2003- 607 $aSomalia$xPolitics and government$y1960-1991 607 $aSomalia$xPolitics and government$y1991- 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y21st century 615 0$aNation-building. 615 0$aInternational relations. 676 $a327.1/17 700 $aLake$b David A.$f1956-$0124169 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910822149103321 996 $aThe statebuilder's dilemma$93966864 997 $aUNINA