LEADER 04121nam 2200745 450 001 9910822042103321 005 20231206231249.0 010 $a1-4426-8852-1 024 7 $a10.3138/9781442688520 035 $a(CKB)2550000000019301 035 $a(OCoLC)635461345 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10382299 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000478526 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11291644 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000478526 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10419278 035 $a(PQKB)10255756 035 $a(CaPaEBR)430811 035 $a(CaBNvSL)slc00224388 035 $a(DE-B1597)465389 035 $a(OCoLC)1013949179 035 $a(OCoLC)944176665 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781442688520 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4672630 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11258287 035 $a(OCoLC)958565642 035 $a(VaAlCD)20.500.12592/0kv8ks 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4672630 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3268510 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000019301 100 $a20160923h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLove and objectivity in virtue ethics $eAristotle, Lonergan, and Nussbaum on emotions and moral insight /$fRobert J. Fitterer 210 1$aToronto, [Ontario] ;$aBuffalo, [New York] ;$aLondon, [England] :$cUniversity of Toronto Press,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (142 p.) 225 1 $aLonergan Studies 311 $a0-8020-9788-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction -- $t1. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Books I, II, III, and VI -- $t2. Lonergan's Theory of Insight and Cognitive Operations -- $t3. Lonergan's 'Common Sense Insight' and Its Relation to Phronesis -- $t4. Emotive Perception of Value and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics -- $tConcluding Summary -- $tNotes -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aSince the Enlightenment, a great deal of ethical philosophy has presumed that rational human beings must set aside their emotions when seeking to make objective and sound moral decisions. Love and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics challenges this presumption, arguing that emotions such as compassion and love are powerful aids in the complex process of attaining objective moral truths in decisions and actions. Drawing on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the work of Bernard Lonergan and Martha Nussbaum, Robert J. Fitterer tests the assumption that the inclusion of the emotions leads to bias in objective judgments or when determining moral truths. Fitterer first demonstrates how certain cognitive operations set out in Aristotelian virtue ethics can indeed arrive at objective moral truth precisely through the contribution emotions make in moral discernment. Then, drawing on Lonergan's notion of inductive insight, he argues that objectivity is the result of the properly functioning subjectivity of a moral agent. Finally, building on his study of Nussbaum's ethical writings, Fitterer concludes that compassionate love is an attitude that actually fosters the likelihood of discerning and choosing the genuine good, and encourages objectivity in moral decision-making. Richly detailed and argued, Love and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics is a convincing study that involves the works of three of the most important writers on ethics and a passionate appeal to re-examine the process through which humans genuinely make vitally important decisions. 410 0$aLonergan studies. 606 $aVirtue 606 $aEthics 606 $aObjectivity 606 $aLove$xPhilosophy 606 $aEmotions 615 0$aVirtue. 615 0$aEthics. 615 0$aObjectivity. 615 0$aLove$xPhilosophy. 615 0$aEmotions. 676 $a179/.9 700 $aFitterer$b Robert J$g(Robert John),$f1959-$01618814 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910822042103321 996 $aLove and objectivity in virtue ethics$93950756 997 $aUNINA