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100   $a20061030d2006      uf         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aIMF-supported programs and crisis prevention $ean analytical framework /$fJun Il Kim
205   $a1st ed.
210   $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund, Policy Review and Development Dept.$dc2006
215   $a1 online resource (39 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/06/156
300   $a"June 2006."
311   $a1-4518-6416-7 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE MODEL""; ""III. MODEL SOLUTION""; ""IV. COMPARATIVE STATICS""; ""V. KEY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL""; ""VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES""
330 3 $aThis paper presents an analytical framework for considering the role of IMF-supported programs in preventing crises, particularly capital account crises. The model builds upon the global games framework to establish a unique relationship between the crisis probability and the parameters of the program, which is assumed to be negotiated between the IMF and the member country, taking explicit account of each party's interests. In the model, from the perspective of the borrowing country, IMF financing and policy adjustment are (perfect) substitutes inasmuch as they both contribute to the country's liquidity and thus reduce the likelihood of a crisis. In equilibrium, however, IMF financing promotes stronger policies, implying that financing and adjustment are strong complements in crisis prevention. Conditionality plays a crucial role in sustaining the program, providing mutual assurances-to the member country that, if it undertakes the agreed policies, financing will indeed be forthcoming, and to the IMF that the country will implement the agreed policies as the IMF disburses its resources. The model helps explain how liquidity crises may come about, how IMF support can reduce the likelihood of a crisis by providing liquidity and sustaining stronger policies, and why the observed mix between financing and adjustment may vary across programs.
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/06/156.
606   $aEconomic assistance$xEconometric models
606   $aEconomic policy$xEconometric models
606   $aFinancial crises$xPrevention$xEconometric models
615  0$aEconomic assistance$xEconometric models.
615  0$aEconomic policy$xEconometric models.
615  0$aFinancial crises$xPrevention$xEconometric models.
700   $aKim$b Jun$g(Jun Il)$01647813
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bPolicy Development and Review Dept.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910822024503321
996   $aIMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention$94065326
997   $aUNINA