LEADER 05182nam 2200577Ia 450 001 9910821871003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 0 $a0191533920 010 0 $a9780191533921 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7038042 035 $a(CKB)24235124000041 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC430670 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL430670 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10271709 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL90468 035 $a(OCoLC)609830473 035 $a(EXLCZ)9924235124000041 100 $a20060920d2006 fy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aPrincipled agents? $ethe political economy of good government /$fTimothy Besley 210 $aOxford ;$aNew York $cOxford University Press$d2006 215 $axi, 266 p. $cill 225 1 $aThe Lindahl lectures 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 234-247) and index. 327 $aIntro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Competing views of government -- 1.1 The issues -- 1.2 This book -- 1.3 Background -- 1.3.1 The size of government -- 1.3.2 Corruption -- 1.3.3 Property rights -- 1.3.4 Trust and turnout -- 1.4 Economic policy making -- 1.4.1 Foundations -- 1.4.2 Good policies -- 1.4.3 The public choice critique of welfare economics -- 1.5 Political economy -- 1.6 Incentives and selection in politics -- 1.7 Concluding comments -- 2 The anatomy of government failure -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Three notions of government failure -- 2.2.1 Pareto inefficiency -- 2.2.2 Distributional failures -- 2.2.3 Wicksellian failures -- 2.2.4 Comparisons -- 2.3 An example: financing a public project -- 2.3.1 Private provision -- 2.3.2 Government provision -- 2.4 Sources of government failure -- 2.4.1 Ignorance -- 2.4.2 Influence -- 2.4.3 The quality of leadership -- 2.5 Sources of political failure -- 2.5.1 Voting -- 2.5.2 Log-rolling and legislative behavior -- 2.6 Dynamics -- 2.6.1 Investment linkages -- 2.6.2 Political and policy linkages -- 2.6.3 Investment and politics -- 2.7 Implications -- 2.8 Concluding comments -- 3 Political agency and accountability -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Elements of political agency models -- 3.2.1 The nature of the uncertainty -- 3.2.2 The motives for holding office -- 3.2.3 The nature of accountability -- 3.2.4 Retrospective voting -- 3.2.5 Model types -- 3.3 The baseline model -- 3.3.1 The environment -- 3.3.2 Equilibrium -- 3.3.3 Implications -- 3.4 Extensions -- 3.4.1 Polarization and competition -- 3.4.2 Information and accountability -- 3.4.3 The nature of the distortion -- 3.4.4 Within-term cycles -- 3.4.5 Multiple issues -- 3.4.6 Multiple two-period terms -- 3.4.7 Indefinite terms -- 3.4.8 Multiple agents -- 3.5 Discussion -- 3.5.1 Civic virtue and the quality of government. 327 $a3.5.2 Decentralization versus centralization -- 3.5.3 Autocracy versus democracy -- 3.5.4 Accountability to whom? -- 3.5.5 Wage policies for politicians -- 3.5.6 Behavioral versus rational choice models -- 3.6 Concluding comments -- 4 Political agency and public finance (with Michael Smart) -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The model -- 4.3 Three scenarios -- 4.3.1 Pure adverse selection -- 4.3.2 Pure moral hazard -- 4.3.3 Combining moral hazard and adverse selection -- 4.4 Implications -- 4.4.1 Equilibrium voter welfare -- 4.4.2 Are good politicians necessarily good for voters? -- 4.4.3 Turnover of politicians -- 4.4.4 The spending cycle -- 4.5 Restraining government -- 4.5.1 A direct restraint on the size of government -- 4.5.2 Indirect restraints -- 4.5.3 Summary -- 4.6 Debt and deficits -- 4.7 Governments versus NGOs -- 4.7.1 Framework -- 4.7.2 Aid to the government -- 4.7.3 Comparisons -- 4.7.4 Further issues -- 4.8 Competence -- 4.9 Conclusions -- Appendix -- 5 Final Comments -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z. 330 $aMainstream policy economics now pays more attention to the delivery of policy outcomes and how incentives and institutional change shape the effectiveness of government. But should these issues be studied against a background of purely self-interested public servants? There is plenty of evidence that many citizens are publicly spirited. Can their motivation be harnessed in the public interest? These lectures review how economic thought on these issues hasevolved. 410 0$aLindahl lectures. 606 $aPublic administration 606 $aGovernment productivity 606 $aAgent (Philosophy)$xPolitical aspects 606 $aMotivation (Psychology)$xPolitical aspects 606 $aPolicy sciences 615 0$aPublic administration. 615 0$aGovernment productivity. 615 0$aAgent (Philosophy)$xPolitical aspects. 615 0$aMotivation (Psychology)$xPolitical aspects. 615 0$aPolicy sciences. 676 $a352.3 700 $aBesley$b Timothy$0119796 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910821871003321 996 $aPrincipled Agents$91124495 997 $aUNINA