LEADER 03465nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910821717103321 005 20240416154256.0 010 $a0-674-06533-6 010 $a0-674-06874-2 024 7 $a10.4159/harvard.9780674065338 035 $a(CKB)2560000000082505 035 $a(OCoLC)794003569 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10568044 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000658271 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11955728 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000658271 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10681248 035 $a(PQKB)11226741 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3301100 035 $a(DE-B1597)178200 035 $a(OCoLC)840445630 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674065338 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3301100 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10568044 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000082505 100 $a20110520d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aRational causation /$fEric Marcus 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cHarvard University Press$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (279 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-674-05990-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tIntroduction -- $t1. Rational Explanation of Belief -- $t2. Rational Explanation of Action -- $t3. (Non-Human) Animals and Their Reasons -- $t4. Rational Explanation and Rational Causation -- $t5. Events and States -- $t6. Physicalism -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIndex 330 $aWe explain what people think and do by citing their reasons, but how do such explanations work, and what do they tell us about the nature of reality? Contemporary efforts to address these questions are often motivated by the worry that our ordinary conception of rationality contains a kernel of supernaturalism-a ghostly presence that meditates on sensory messages and orchestrates behavior on the basis of its ethereal calculations. In shunning this otherworldly conception, contemporary philosophers have focused on the project of "naturalizing" the mind, viewing it as a kind of machine that converts sensory input and bodily impulse into thought and action. Eric Marcus rejects this choice between physicalism and supernaturalism as false and defends a third way. He argues that philosophers have failed to take seriously the idea that rational explanations postulate a distinctive sort of causation-rational causation. Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. Marcus defends this position against a wide array of physicalist arguments that have captivated philosophers of mind for decades. Along the way he provides novel views on, for example, the difference between rational and nonrational animals and the distinction between states and events. 606 $aAct (Philosophy) 606 $aAgent (Philosophy) 606 $aCausation 615 0$aAct (Philosophy) 615 0$aAgent (Philosophy) 615 0$aCausation. 676 $a122 686 $aCC 5500$2rvk 700 $aMarcus$b Eric$f1968-$01634993 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910821717103321 996 $aRational causation$93975502 997 $aUNINA