LEADER 06477oam 2200769Ia 450 001 9910821666303321 005 20190503073351.0 010 $a0-262-26447-1 010 $a1-282-69477-4 010 $a9786612694776 010 $a0-262-25922-2 024 8 $a9786612694776 024 3 $a9780262259224 035 $a(CKB)2560000000007137 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000340325 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11247531 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000340325 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10387048 035 $a(PQKB)10004091 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000131002 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3339088 035 $a(OCoLC)503092562$z(OCoLC)643588851$z(OCoLC)646839596$z(OCoLC)663077471$z(OCoLC)748590943$z(OCoLC)961543323$z(OCoLC)963723092$z(OCoLC)966233333$z(OCoLC)988438542$z(OCoLC)992033207$z(OCoLC)1000437705$z(OCoLC)1004384667$z(OCoLC)1055377730$z(OCoLC)1066573790$z(OCoLC)1081296515 035 $a(OCoLC-P)503092562 035 $a(MaCbMITP)8434 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3339088 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10340971 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL269477 035 $a(OCoLC)816568715 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000007137 100 $a20100202d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMental reality /$fGalen Strawson 205 $a2nd ed., with a new appendix. 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dİ2010 210 4$dİ2010 215 $a1 online resource (xx, 373 p.) $cill 225 1 $aRepresentation and mind 300 $a"A Bradford book." 311 $a0-262-51310-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aA default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- The linguistic argument -- Materialism and monism -- A comment on reduction -- The impossibility of an objective phenomenology -- Asymmetry and reduction -- Equal-status monism -- Panpsychism -- The inescapability of metaphysics -- Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- Ignorance -- Sensory spaces -- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- The hard part of the mind-body problem -- Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- A comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on -- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- Mentalism -- Strict or pure process idealism -- Active-principle idealism -- Stuff idealism -- Immaterialism -- The positions restated -- The dualist options -- Frege's thesis -- Objections to pure process idealism -- The problem of mental dispositions -- Mental -- Shared abilities -- The sorting ability -- The definition of mental being -- Mental phenomena -- The view that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- Natural intentionality -- E/c intentionality -- The experienceless -- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- Experience, purely experiential content, and n/c intentionality -- Concepts in nature -- Intentionality and experience -- Summary with problem -- Pain and pain -- The neo-behaviorist view -- A linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- A challenge -- The Sirians -- N.N. Novel -- An objection to the Sirians -- The Betelgeuzians -- The point of the Sirians -- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- The weather watchers -- The rooting story -- What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- The aptitudes of mental states -- The argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- The argument from the conditions for language ability -- The argument from the nature of desire -- Desire and affect -- The argument from the phenomenology of desire -- Behavior -- A hopeless definition -- Difficulties -- Other-observability -- Neo-behaviorism -- The concept of mind. 330 $a"In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7"--MIT CogNet. 410 0$aRepresentation and mind. 606 $aConsciousness 606 $aBehaviorism (Psychology) 606 $aMind and body 606 $aMaterialism 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 610 $aPHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General 610 $aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General 615 0$aConsciousness. 615 0$aBehaviorism (Psychology) 615 0$aMind and body. 615 0$aMaterialism. 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 676 $a128/.2 700 $aStrawson$b Galen$0953504 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910821666303321 996 $aMental reality$93939224 997 $aUNINA