LEADER 03651nam 2200505Ia 450 001 9910821640903321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-7735-6865-4 024 7 $a10.1515/9780773568655 035 $a(CKB)1000000000244975 035 $a(OCoLC)180773080 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10119850 035 $a(VaAlCD)20.500.12592/sc16tm 035 $a(schport)gibson_crkn/2009-12-01/1/400277 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3330535 035 $a(DE-B1597)655564 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780773568655 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3243502 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000244975 100 $a20000404d2001 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aNATO and the bomb $eCanadian defenders confront critics /$fErika Simpson 210 $aMontreal $cMcGill-Queen's University Press$dc2001 215 $a1 online resource (365 p.) 311 $a0-7735-2118-6 311 $a0-7735-2088-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront Matter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tAbbreviations and Definitions -- $tIntroduction -- $tCanada?s NATO Commitments during the Cold War -- $tCanadian Belief Systems in Context -- $tThe Belief Systems of Defenders: General Patterns between 1963 and 1989 -- $tThe Belief Systems of Critics: General Patterns between 1963 and 1989 -- $tA Case Study: The Diefenbaker Government?s Shifting NATO Commitments, 1957?1963 -- $tThe Traditional Beliefs and Assumptions of Defenders, 1957?1963 -- $tThe Original Beliefs of Critics and the Onset of New Ways of Thinking, 1957?1963 -- $tThe Root Causes of Confrontation: Reasons for Defenders? and Critics? Belief Systems, 1930s to 1980s -- $tThe Dilemma of Alliance Membership -- $tNotes -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aUsing a new conceptual framework, this study documents and analyses the underlying convictions of influential Canadians, explains why there were such varied degrees of support for NATO, and shows why different leaders either supported or rejected nuclear weapons and the stationing of the Canadian Forces in Europe. Examples taken from previously classified documents illustrate how the underlying convictions of leaders such as Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau significantly shaped defence policy. Behind-the-scenes maneuvering and competing beliefs about nuclear weapons, deterrence strategy, and possible entrapment in a nuclear war led some to defend and others to criticize Canada's approach to both NATO and the bomb. Despite the technological ability and resources to develop its own nuclear weapons - or to acquire them from the United States - Canada ultimately chose not to become a nuclear power. Why did some Canadian leaders defend the nuclear option and urge the deployment of the Canadian Forces in Europe? Why did others condemn the country's nuclear commitments and call for an end to the arms race? Simpson shows that some leaders rejected prevailing American defence strategy and weapons systems to pursue alternative approaches to managing Canada's complex bilateral and multilateral defence relationships. 606 $aNuclear weapons$xGovernment policy$zCanada 607 $aCanada$xMilitary policy 615 0$aNuclear weapons$xGovernment policy 676 $a355/.033571 700 $aSimpson$b Erika$f1962-$01762804 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910821640903321 996 $aNATO and the bomb$94202940 997 $aUNINA