LEADER 04149nam 2200685 450 001 9910821548303321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-691-12509-0 010 $a1-4008-4947-0 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400849475 035 $a(CKB)2550000001161108 035 $a(EBL)1422533 035 $a(OCoLC)863037110 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001173992 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11678491 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001173992 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11105787 035 $a(PQKB)11218145 035 $a(OCoLC)863157671 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse37221 035 $a(DE-B1597)447947 035 $a(OCoLC)1013938417 035 $a(OCoLC)922665789 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400849475 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1422533 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10801285 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL544202 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1422533 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001161108 100 $a20051001h20062006 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFilibuster $eobstruction and lawmaking in the U.S. Senate /$fGregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler 205 $aCourse Book 210 1$aPrinceton, New Jersey :$cPrinceton University Press,$d[2006] 210 4$dİ2006 215 $a1 online resource (326 p.) 225 1 $aPrinceton studies in American politics : historical, international, and comparative perspectives 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-13406-5 311 $a1-306-12951-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [285]-301) and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tList of Tables -- $tList of Figures -- $tPreface -- $tChapter 1. Introduction -- $tChapter 2. Obstruction in Theoretical Context -- $tChapter 3. The Mutability of Senate Rules -- $tChapter 4. Where's the Pivot? -- $tChapter 5. Dilatory Motions and the Success of Obstruction -- $tChapter 6. Obstruction and the Tariff -- $tChapter 7. Slavery and Obstruction in the Antebellum Senate -- $tChapter 8. Obstruction and Institutional Change -- $tChapter 9. Cloture Reform Reconsidered -- $tChapter 10. The Impact of Cloture on the Appropriations Process -- $tChapter 11. Conclusion -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex -- $t Backmatter 330 $aParliamentary obstruction, popularly known as the "filibuster," has been a defining feature of the U.S. Senate throughout its history. In this book, Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler explain how the Senate managed to satisfy its lawmaking role during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when it lacked seemingly essential formal rules for governing debate. What prevented the Senate from self-destructing during this time? The authors argue that in a system where filibusters played out as wars of attrition, the threat of rule changes prevented the institution from devolving into parliamentary chaos. They show that institutional patterns of behavior induced by inherited rules did not render Senate rules immune from fundamental changes. The authors' theoretical arguments are supported through a combination of extensive quantitative and case-study analysis, which spans a broad swath of history. They consider how changes in the larger institutional and political context--such as the expansion of the country and the move to direct election of senators--led to changes in the Senate regarding debate rules. They further investigate the impact these changes had on the functioning of the Senate. The book concludes with a discussion relating battles over obstruction in the Senate's past to recent conflicts over judicial nominations. 410 0$aPrinceton studies in American politics. 606 $aFilibusters (Political science)$zUnited States 615 0$aFilibusters (Political science) 676 $a328.73 700 $aWawro$b Gregory J$g(Gregory John)$01035639 701 $aSchickler$b Eric$f1969-$01643642 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910821548303321 996 $aFilibuster$94074688 997 $aUNINA