LEADER 05460nam 2200673Ia 450 001 9910821464003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8166-5561-8 010 $a0-8166-1246-3 035 $a(CKB)1000000000479448 035 $a(EBL)316603 035 $a(OCoLC)182732676 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000225939 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11187136 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000225939 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10233533 035 $a(PQKB)10735502 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC316603 035 $a(OCoLC)230205463 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse39655 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL316603 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10199644 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL523323 035 $a(OCoLC)437191368 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000479448 100 $a19830711d1984 ub 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aPractical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will /$fNorman O. Dahl 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aMinneapolis $cUniversity of Minnesota Press$dc1984 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 302 pages) 225 1 $aMinnesota publications in the humanities ;$vv. 4 300 $aIncludes index. 311 0 $a0-8166-1245-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 287-291) and index. 327 $aContents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Part One: Practical Reason and Aristotle; Chapter 1 A Statement of the Problem; Section I: The Nature of Practical Reason; Section II: The Scope of Practical Reason; Section III: Does Aristotle's Ethics Rest on Practical Reason?; Chapter 2 Aristotle and Hume: A Preliminary Contrast; Section I: Action as a Result of Appetite; Section II: Action as a Result of Desire and Deliberation; Section III: The Practical Syllogism; Section IV: A Preliminary Contrast; Chapter 3 Reason and General Ends; Section I: Reason Apprehends the Ends of Action 327 $aSection II: Universal Ends Acquired by Induction: The Role of Nous in Practical Affairs; Section III: Apprehending vs. Acquiring Ends; Section IV: A Sketch of a Theory; Section V: Objections; Chapter 4 The Pervasiveness of Aristotle's Views on Practical Reason; Section I: Practical Wisdom and Virtue; Section II: Excellence in Deliberation; Section III: Nature and the End of Action (NE 1114b16-25); Section IV: Aristotle's Methodology in Ethics and Politics; Chapter 5 The Apparent Support for the Humean Position; Section I: Deliberation Is about Means 327 $aSection II: Virtue Preserves First Principles; Section III: Phrone?sis Provides One with the Right Means, Arete? with the Right Ends; Chapter 6 A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 7 The Interest of Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason: Happiness and the Good Relative to Human Beings; Section I: Happiness as the End of Action; Section II: The Good as Fulfilling the Ergon of Human Beings Well; Section III: The Good for Human Beings and the Good Human Being: Their Connection; Chapter 8 Does Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason Provide an Adequate Basis for Ethics? 327 $aSection I: Initial Objections; Section II: The Incompleteness of Aristotle's Position; Section III: Objectivity Once More; Part Two: Aristotle and Weakness of the Will; Chapter 9 The Traditional Interpretation: Some Problems and Preliminaries; Section I: The Traditional Interpretation; Section II: Some Problems for the Traditional Interpretation; Section III: The Seriousness of These Problems; Section IV: Variations of the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Methodological Problem; Chapter 10 An Argument for the Traditional Interpretation; Section I: A Thesis about Knowledge and Action 327 $aSection II: Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia; Section III: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section IV: Solutions to the Problems Raised for the Traditional Interpretation; Section V: A Summary of the Argument; Chapter 11 An Argument for an Alternative Interpretation; Section I: Conflicts of Motive and Akrasia; Section II: The Thesis about Knowledge and Action Reconsidered; Section III: Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia; Section IV: The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia; Section V: Two Final Objections; Section VI: A Summary; Concluding Remarks; Appendix I: NE 1143a35-b5 330 $aPractical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. One of the central problems in recent moral philosophy is the apparent tension between the ""practical"" or ""action-guiding"" side of moral judgments and their objectivity. That tension would not exist if practical reason existed (if reason played a substantial role in producing motivation) and if recognition of obligation 410 0$aMinnesota publications in the humanities ;$vv. 4. 606 $aEthics, Ancient 606 $aReason$xHistory 615 0$aEthics, Ancient. 615 0$aReason$xHistory. 676 $a171/.3 700 $aDahl$b Norman O$043221 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910821464003321 996 $aPractical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the will$94083779 997 $aUNINA