LEADER 03892nam 22007574a 450 001 9910820828803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-107-12218-X 010 $a0-511-04726-6 010 $a0-511-17435-7 010 $a1-280-43302-7 010 $a0-511-15416-X 010 $a0-521-79323-8 010 $a0-511-32828-1 010 $a0-511-49110-7 035 $a(CKB)111056485622534 035 $a(EBL)201389 035 $a(OCoLC)475914742 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000136558 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11136101 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000136558 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10084006 035 $a(PQKB)10653063 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511491108 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC201389 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5292039 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL201389 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr5008034 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL436682 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5292039 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL43302 035 $a(OCoLC)1028954206 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111056485622534 100 $a20010207d2001 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aDemocracy in divided societies $eelectoral engineering for conflict management /$fBenjamin Reilly 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aCambridge, UK ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$d2001 215 $a1 online resource (xiii, 217 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aTheories of institutional design 300 $aOriginally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral--Australian National University). 311 0 $a0-521-79730-6 311 0 $a0-511-01695-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 194-214) and index. 327 $aIntroduction: democracy in divided societies -- The historical development of preferential voting -- Centripetal incentives and political engineering in Australia -- The rise and fall of centripetalism in Papua New Guinea -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 1: Fiji and Sri Lanka compared -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 2: Northern Ireland, Estonia and beyond -- Technical variations and the theory of preference voting -- Conclusion: assessing the evidence. 330 $aDemocracy is inherently difficult in societies divided along deep ethnic cleavages. Elections in such societies will often encourage 'centrifugal' politics which reward extremist ethnic appeals, zero-sum political behaviour and ethnic conflict, and which consequently often lead to the breakdown of democracy. Reilly examines the potential of 'electoral engineering' as a mechanism of conflict management in divided societies. He focuses on the little-known experience of a number of divided societies which have used preferential, vote-pooling electoral systems - such as Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Fiji. Examination of these cases shows that electoral systems which encourage bargaining between rival political actors, which promote the development of broad-based, aggregative political parties and which present campaigning politicians with incentives to attract votes from a range of ethnic groups can, under certain conditions, encourage the development of moderate, accommodatory political competition in divided societies. 410 0$aTheories of institutional design. 606 $aElections$vCase studies 606 $aConflict management$vCase studies 606 $aDemocracy$vCase studies 615 0$aElections 615 0$aConflict management 615 0$aDemocracy 676 $a324.6/3 700 $aReilly$b Ben$0558052 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910820828803321 996 $aDemocracy in divided societies$9931648 997 $aUNINA