LEADER 04278nam 2200733 450 001 9910820812703321 005 20230307200443.0 010 $a0-231-53834-0 024 7 $a10.7312/gunn16940 035 $a(CKB)3710000000250006 035 $a(EBL)1801732 035 $a(OCoLC)892244192 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001350726 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12619387 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001350726 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11295735 035 $a(PQKB)10056366 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001076035 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1801732 035 $a(DE-B1597)458344 035 $a(OCoLC)1024051220 035 $a(OCoLC)1029831177 035 $a(OCoLC)1032678676 035 $a(OCoLC)1037969547 035 $a(OCoLC)1041973056 035 $a(OCoLC)1046622001 035 $a(OCoLC)1046995292 035 $a(OCoLC)1049610845 035 $a(OCoLC)1054871480 035 $a(OCoLC)979751966 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780231538343 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1801732 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10940843 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL668684 035 $a(OCoLC)895712702 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000250006 100 $a20140929h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurun#---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aSocial inquiry after Wittgenstein and Kuhn $eleaving everything as it is /$fJohn G. Gunnell ; cover design, Chang Jae Lee 210 1$aNew York ;$aChichester, England :$cColumbia University Press,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (279 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a1-322-37402-3 311 0 $a0-231-16940-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tAbbreviations --$tIntroduction --$t1. Thomas Kuhn & the Shadow of Wittgenstein --$t2. Wittgenstein & Social Theory --$t3. Mind, Meaning, & Interpretation --$t4. Investigating the Investigations --$t5. Conventional Objects, Concepts, & the Practice of Interpretation --$t6. Interpreting Science: Kuhn as a Social Theorist --$t7. Wittgenstein on the Moon: Certainty, Truth, & Value --$tReferences --$tIndex 330 $aA distinctive feature of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work after 1930 was his turn to a conception of philosophy as a form of social inquiry, John G. Gunnell argues, and Thomas Kuhn's approach to the philosophy of science exemplified this conception. In this book, Gunnell shows how these philosophers address foundational issues in the social and human sciences, particularly the vision of social inquiry as an interpretive endeavor and the distinctive cognitive and practical relationship between social inquiry and its subject matter. Gunnell speaks directly to philosophers and practitioners of the social and human sciences. He tackles the demarcation between natural and social science; the nature of social phenomena; the concept and method of interpretation; the relationship between language and thought; the problem of knowledge of other minds; and the character of descriptive and normative judgments about practices that are the object of inquiry. Though Wittgenstein and Kuhn are often criticized as initiating a modern descent into relativism, this book shows that the true effect of their work was to undermine the basic assumptions of contemporary social and human science practice. It also problematized the authority of philosophy and other forms of social inquiry to specify the criteria for judging such matters as truth and justice. When Wittgenstein stated that "philosophy leaves everything as it is," he did not mean that philosophy would be left as it was or that philosophy would have no impact on what it studied, but rather that the activity of inquiry did not, simply by virtue of its performance, transform the object of inquiry. 606 $aSocial sciences$xPhilosophy 615 0$aSocial sciences$xPhilosophy. 676 $a300.1 700 $aGunnell$b John G.$0614723 702 $aLee$b Chang Jae 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910820812703321 996 $aSocial inquiry after Wittgenstein and Kuhn$94090632 997 $aUNINA