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100   $a19910425d1992      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aSprings of action $eunderstanding intentional behavior /$fAlfred R. Mele
210   $aNew York $cOxford University Press$d1992
215   $a1 online resource (285 p.)
225 1 $aOxford scholarship online
300   $aPreviously issued in print: 1992.
311   $a0-19-507114-X 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aContents; PART I; 1 Introduction; 2 Mental Causation; 3 Wanting and Wanting Most; 4 P1* and the Plasticity of Motivational Strength; 5 Irresistible Desires; 6 Effective Reasons; PART II; 7 Transition: Introducing Intentions; 8 Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action; 9 Executive States: Settling Things; 10 The Executive Dimension of Proximal Intentions; 11 Intention's Content; 12 Acquiring Intentions; 13 Conclusion: An Unsuccessful Brief Against ""Causalism""; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; V; W
330   $aTackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from that of beliefs and desires. Mele, also offers a provocative expl
410  0$aOxford scholarship online.
606   $aAct (Philosophy)
606   $aIntentionality (Philosophy)
606   $aIntentionalism
615  0$aAct (Philosophy)
615  0$aIntentionality (Philosophy)
615  0$aIntentionalism.
676   $a128/.4
700   $aMele$b Alfred R.$f1951-$01656923
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910820799703321
996   $aSprings of action$94010063
997   $aUNINA