LEADER 03722nam 2200661Ia 450 001 9910820611403321 005 20240416151821.0 010 $a0-674-02917-8 024 7 $a10.4159/9780674029170 035 $a(CKB)1000000000805540 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH23050617 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000483502 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11317824 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000483502 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10528804 035 $a(PQKB)10045693 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000128731 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12000053 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128731 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10069677 035 $a(PQKB)11723998 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3300572 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3300572 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10326117 035 $a(OCoLC)923112179 035 $a(DE-B1597)589734 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674029170 035 $a(OCoLC)1294424380 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000805540 100 $a20010820d2002 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aConfusion $ea study in the theory of knowledge /$fJoseph L. Camp, Jr 210 $aCambridge, MA ;$aLondon $cHarvard University Press$d2002 215 $a1 online resource (256 p.) 300 $aOriginally published: 2002. 311 $a0-674-00620-8 311 $a0-674-01591-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aI Material Falsity 1. Thinking One Thing Is Another 2. A Little History II What Confusion Is 3. Fred and the Ant Colony 4. The Semantic Use of Psychological Language III A Little Logic 5. Ambiguity 6. Humoring IV Truth-Valuing 7. Calibration 8. Failure to Refer 9. How You Convince People--Including Yourself--of the Theory of Descriptions 10. Trying to Predicate Existence V A Logic for Confusion 11. Explicating 12. Good Advice 13. How Fred Should Think VI Curing Confusion 14. Semantic Self-Awareness 15. Two Charleys 16. Young Newton VII Flexible Sameness 17. Self-Induced Confusion 18. The Theory of Ideas 19. Making Category Mistakes and Loving It Notes Index 330 $aEveryone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. 330 $bEveryone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. In order to make that idea precise, one needs a logic of confused thought that is blind to the distinction between the objects that have been confused. Confused thought and language cannot be characterized as true or false even though reasoning conducted in such language can be classified as valid or invalid. To the extent that philosophers have addressed this issue at all, they take it for granted that confusion is a kind of ambiguity. Camp rejects this notion; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. To attribute confusion to someone is to take up a paternalistic stance in evaluating his reasoning. Camp proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science. 606 $aErrors 606 $aKnowledge, Theory of 615 0$aErrors. 615 0$aKnowledge, Theory of. 676 $a165 700 $aCamp$b Joseph L$01617405 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910820611403321 996 $aConfusion$94091711 997 $aUNINA