LEADER 05744nam 2200733Ia 450 001 9910820369203321 005 20240417041344.0 010 $a0-7914-8515-3 010 $a1-4237-3980-9 024 7 $a10.1515/9780791485156 035 $a(CKB)1000000000458382 035 $a(OCoLC)62751310 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10594729 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000186747 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11170639 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000186747 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10218884 035 $a(PQKB)10722484 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3408402 035 $a(OCoLC)62365164 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse6145 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3408402 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10594729 035 $a(DE-B1597)684556 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780791485156 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000458382 100 $a20040226d2004 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aJustice for the past$b[electronic resource] /$fStephen Kershnar 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aAlbany $cState University of New York Press$d2004 215 $a1 online resource (171 p.) 225 0 $aSUNY series in American constitutionalism 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-7914-6071-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 131-155) and index. 327 $aIntro -- Justice for the Past -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- SECTION 1 -- Introduction -- SECTION 2: Civil Rights Laws -- 1. The Most Qualified Applicant -- PART 1. The Job Qualification -- PART 2. The Best Conception of a Job Qualification Yields at Most a Very Weak Reason to Favor a Meritocracy -- PART 3. Antidiscrimination Laws Cannot Be Justified by Meritocratic Concerns -- PART 4. Qualifications for Educational Institutions -- PART 5. Conclusion -- SECTION 3: Strong Affirmative Action -- 2. Strong Affirmative-Action Programs at State Institutions -- PART 1. Introduction -- PART 2. The Duty to Judge Persons According to Their Interests and Desert -- PART 3. Strong Affirmative-Action Programs at State Educational Institutions Cannot Be Justified via Compensatory Justice -- PART 4. Conclusion -- 3. Uncertain Damages to Racial Minorities and Strong Affirmative Action -- PART 1. The Hypothetical Imperative to Distribute Resources in a Just Manner -- PART 2. Compensatory Justice and the Assessment of Damages -- PART 3. Compensatory Justice and Inadequate Knowledge of Damages -- PART 4. We Do Not Have Adequate Knowledge of the Amount of Compensable Injury to Current Members of Some Racial Minority Groups -- PART 5. Conclusion -- SECTION 4: Reparations for Slavery -- 4. The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations -- PART 1. Introduction -- PART 2. Slavery Did Not Harm the Descendants of Slaves -- PART 3. Compensation May Be Owed to the Descendants of Slaves As a Result of a Legitimate Inheritance Claim -- PART 4. Conclusion -- 5. Reject the Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations -- PART 1. Objections to the Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations -- PART 2. Who Owes Compensation? -- PART 3 Conclusion -- SECTION 5: Proper Respect -- 6. Intrinsic Moral Value and Racial Differences -- PART 1. The Expression of Equal Moral Value -- PART 2. The Argument. 327 $aPART 3. Implications of the Argument -- PART 4. Conclusion -- SECTION 6: Educational Diversity -- 7. Experiential Diversity -- PART 1. Grutter and Bakke -- PART 2. Experiential Diversity and Truth -- PART 3. A More General Approach to Diversity -- PART 4 Equal-Opportunity Arguments -- PART 5 Conclusion -- Notes -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 1 -- CHAPTER 2 -- CHAPTER 3 -- CHAPTER 4 -- CHAPTER 5 -- CHAPTER 6 -- CHAPTER 7 -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- G -- H -- I -- J -- L -- M -- P -- R -- S -- T -- W. 330 $aAmong the most controversial issues in the United States is the question of whether public or private agencies should adopt preferential treatment programs or be required to pay reparations for slavery. Using a carefully reasoned philosophical approach, Stephen Kershnar argues that programs such as affirmative action and calls for slavery reparations are unjust for three reasons. First, the state has a duty to direct resources to those persons who, through their abilities, will benefit most from them. Second, he argues that, in the case of slavery, past injustice?where both the victims and perpetrators are long dead?cannot ground current claims to compensation. As terrible as slavery was, those who claim a right to compensation today owe their existence to it, he reasons, and since the events that bring about a person's existence are normally thought to be beneficial, past injustices do not warrant compensation. Finally, even if past injustices were allowed to serve as the basis of compensation in the present, other variables prevent a reasonable estimation of the amount owed. 606 $aMinorities$xCivil rights$zUnited States 606 $aWomen's rights$zUnited States 606 $aMinorities$xGovernment policy$zUnited States 606 $aWomen$xGovernment policy$zUnited States 606 $aAffirmative action programs$zUnited States 606 $aAfrican Americans$xReparations 615 0$aMinorities$xCivil rights 615 0$aWomen's rights 615 0$aMinorities$xGovernment policy 615 0$aWomen$xGovernment policy 615 0$aAffirmative action programs 615 0$aAfrican Americans$xReparations. 676 $a323.173 700 $aKershnar$b Stephen$0892540 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910820369203321 996 $aJustice for the past$93945781 997 $aUNINA