LEADER 03220nam 2200721Ia 450 001 9910820228903321 005 20240416151016.0 010 $a0-674-26638-2 010 $a0-674-04191-7 024 7 $a10.4159/9780674041912 035 $a(CKB)1000000000786930 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH23050831 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000125415 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11133829 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000125415 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10026674 035 $a(PQKB)10846244 035 $a(DE-B1597)457729 035 $a(OCoLC)1013954095 035 $a(OCoLC)1029825562 035 $a(OCoLC)1032681800 035 $a(OCoLC)1037979512 035 $a(OCoLC)1042031147 035 $a(OCoLC)1046614940 035 $a(OCoLC)1047022325 035 $a(OCoLC)434003851 035 $a(OCoLC)979740130 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674041912 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3300371 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10318361 035 $a(OCoLC)923110329 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3300371 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000786930 100 $a20070105e20072005 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCommand at sea $enaval command and control since the sixteenth century /$fMichael A. Palmer 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aCambridge, MA ;$aLondon $cHarvard University Press$d2007 215 $a1 online resource (400 p. ) $cmaps 300 $aOriginally published: 2005. 311 $a0-674-02411-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tBattle Maps -- $tPrologue: A Regular Confusion -- $t1. Land Warfare Afloat: Before 1650 -- $t2. The Anglo-Dutch Wars -- $t3. At the Dawn of the Enlightenment -- $t4. The Conundrum of the Line Ahead -- $t5. The Advent of Numerary Signaling Systems -- $t6. The Zenith of the Age of Fighting Sail -- $t7. The Age of Steam through the Great War -- $t8. From 1918 through the Second World War -- $t9. The Cold War and Beyond -- $tConclusion: The Crucial Paradox of Knowledge -- $tNotes -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIndex 330 $aIn this grand history of naval warfare, Palmer observes five centuries of dramatic encounters under sail and steam. From reliance on signal flags in the seventeenth century to satellite communications in the twenty-first, admirals looked to the next advance in technology as the one that would allow them to control their forces. But while abilities to communicate improved, Palmer shows how other technologies simultaneously shrank admirals' windows of decision. The result was simple, if not obvious: naval commanders have never had sufficient means or time to direct subordinates in battle. 606 $aCommand and control systems$xHistory 606 $aNaval history 606 $aCommand of troops 615 0$aCommand and control systems$xHistory. 615 0$aNaval history. 615 0$aCommand of troops. 676 $a359.33041 700 $aPalmer$b Michael A$0632904 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910820228903321 996 $aCommand at sea$94097469 997 $aUNINA