LEADER 03995oam 2200649Ia 450 001 9910820220303321 005 20190503073338.0 010 $a1-282-09716-4 010 $a9786612097164 010 $a0-262-27423-X 010 $a1-4294-6557-3 035 $a(CKB)1000000000472546 035 $a(EBL)3338512 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000154012 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11160201 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000154012 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10406557 035 $a(PQKB)11073589 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3338512 035 $a(OCoLC)123415009$z(OCoLC)232159965$z(OCoLC)473705976$z(OCoLC)487741634$z(OCoLC)614988434$z(OCoLC)648223590$z(OCoLC)722564371$z(OCoLC)827887459$z(OCoLC)888790092$z(OCoLC)923250334$z(OCoLC)961526298$z(OCoLC)962598285$z(OCoLC)1037500950$z(OCoLC)1037548381 035 $a(OCoLC-P)123415009 035 $a(MaCbMITP)2978 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3338512 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10173567 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL209716 035 $a(OCoLC)123415009 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000472546 100 $a20070423d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFeeling pain and being in pain /$fNikola Grahek 205 $a2nd ed. 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dİ2007 210 4$dİ2007 215 $a1 online resource (199 p.) 300 $a"A Bradford book." 311 $a0-262-51732-9 311 $a0-262-07283-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a""Contents""; ""Acknowledgments""; ""Foreword""; ""1 - Introduction""; ""2 - The Biological Function and Importance of Pain""; ""3 - Dissociation Phenomena in Human Pain Experience""; ""4 - Pain Asymbolia""; ""5 - How Is Pain without Painfulness Possible?""; ""6 - Conceptual and Theoretical Implications of Pain Asymbolia""; ""7 - Pain Quality and Painfulness without Pain""; ""8 - C-Fibers and All That""; ""References""; ""Index"" 330 $aAn examination of the two most radical dissociation syndromes of the human pain experience--pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain--and what they reveal about the complex nature of pain and its sensory, cognitive, and behavioral components.In Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, Nikola Grahek examines two of the most radical dissociation syndromes to be found in human pain experience: pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain. Grahek shows that these two syndromes--the complete dissociation of the sensory dimension of pain from its affective, cognitive, and behavioral components, and its opposite, the dissociation of pain's affective components from its sensory-discriminative components (inconceivable to most of us but documented by ample clinical evidence)--have much to teach us about the true nature and structure of human pain experience.Grahek explains the crucial distinction betweenfeeling pain and being in pain, defending it on both conceptual and empirical grounds. He argues that the two dissociative syndromes reveal the complexity of the human pain experience: its major components, the role they play in overall pain experience, the way they work together, and the basic neural structures and mechanisms that subserve them.Feeling Pain and Being in Pain does not offer another philosophical theory of pain that conclusively supports or definitively refutes either subjectivist or objectivist assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Instead, Grahek calls for a less doctrinaire and more balanced approach to the study of mind-brain phenomena. 606 $aPain 606 $aPain perception 610 $aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General 615 0$aPain. 615 0$aPain perception. 676 $a616/.0472 700 $aGrahek$b Nikola$01122568 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910820220303321 996 $aFeeling pain and being in pain$94097397 997 $aUNINA