LEADER 02515nam 2200637Ia 450 001 9910820123203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-19-773111-2 010 $a1-280-52508-8 010 $a0-19-536233-0 024 7 $a10.1093/oso/9780195064971.001.0001 035 $a(CKB)1000000000408280 035 $a(EBL)273090 035 $a(OCoLC)476014691 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000212063 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11194500 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000212063 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10137347 035 $a(PQKB)10509861 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL273090 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10279470 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL52508 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC273090 035 $a(OCoLC)1406781711 035 $a(StDuBDS)9780197731116 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000408280 100 $a19900227d1991 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe non-reality of free will /$fRichard Double 210 $aNew York $cOxford University Press$d1991 215 $a1 online resource (260 pages) 225 1 $aOxford scholarship online 300 $aBibliography: p235-241. _ Includes index. 300 $aPreviously issued in print: 1990. 311 0 $a0-19-506497-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 235-241) and index. 327 $aContents; 1 Introduction; 1. The Problem of the Reality of Free Will; 2. Definitions of Terms; 3. Overview of the Text; 2 A Compatibilist Account of Free Will; 3 Does Freedom Require Morality?; 4 Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility; 5 Free Will as an Exemplar Concept; 6 Meta-Compatibilism; 7 An Argument for Moral Non-Realism; 8 Troubles with Libertarianism; 9 Conclusion; NOTES; REFERENCES; INDEX 330 8 $aThis monograph offers an argument concerning free will and moral responsibility which identifies hierarchical compatibilism - a view espoused by such philosophers as Neely, Watson, Levin and Dennett - as the most plausible account of free will. 410 0$aOxford scholarship online. 606 $aFree will and determinism 606 $aResponsibility 615 0$aFree will and determinism. 615 0$aResponsibility. 676 $a123/.5 700 $aDouble$b Richard$01124201 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910820123203321 996 $aNon-reality of free-will$93641406 997 $aUNINA