LEADER 01016cam0-22003131i-450 001 990001827520403321 005 20210719173055.0 035 $a000182752 035 $aFED01000182752 035 $a(Aleph)000182752FED01 035 $a000182752 100 $a20021010d1889----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aita 102 $aIT 200 1 $a<>pioggia di Napoli$emedii normali e valori estremi dedotti dalla discussione delle osservazioni meteorologiche fatte nel R. Osservatorio di Capodimonte dal 1821 al 1887$fEnrico Passaro 210 $aNapoli$c...$d1889 215 $a7 p.$d30 cm 300 $aEstr. da: Bollettino del Collegio degli Ingegneri ed Architetti in Napoli, 7(11),1889. 610 0 $aMeteorologia 676 $a551.5 700 1$aPassaro,$bEnrico$0357683 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990001827520403321 952 $a60 DONO COMES 25/22$b36907$fFAGBC 959 $aFAGBC 996 $aPioggia di Napoli$9411553 997 $aUNINA DB $aING01 LEADER 01489cam0 2200337 450 001 E600200064834 005 20211102104825.0 100 $a20100617d1970 |||||ita|0103 ba 101 $ager 102 $aBE 200 1 $aOriginalideen über die interessantesten Gegenstände der Philosophie$enebst einem kritischen Anzeiger der wichtigsten philosophischen Schriften$fKarl Heinrich Heydenreich 205 $aImpression anastaltique 210 $aBruxelles$cCulture et Civilisation$d1970 215 $a3 v.$d19 cm 225 2 $aAetas kantiana$v100 300 $aRipr. facs. dell'ed. : Leipzig, 1793 410 1$1001LAEC00028480$12001 $a*Aetas kantiana$v100 700 1$aHeydenreich$b, Karl Heinrich$3A600200061584$4070$0220463 801 0$aIT$bUNISOB$c20211102$gRICA 850 $aUNISOB 852 $aUNISOB$j100|Coll|19|K$m18385 852 $aUNISOB$j100|Coll|19|K$m18383 852 $aUNISOB$j100|Coll|19|K$m18384 912 $aE600200064834 940 $aM 102 Monografia moderna SBN 941 $aM 957 $a100|Coll|19|K$b000100$gSi$d18385$racquisto$1cutolo$2UNISOB$3UNISOB$420100617090043.0$520211102104811.0$6Alfano 957 $a100|Coll|19|K$b000100$i-1$gSI$d18383$1Alfano$2UNISOB$3UNISOB$420211102104638.0$520211102104716.0$6Alfano 957 $a100|Coll|19|K$b000100$i-2$gSI$d18384$1Alfano$2UNISOB$3UNISOB$420211102104719.0$520211102104749.0$6Alfano 996 $aOriginalideen über die interessantesten Gegenstände der Philosophie$9569037 997 $aUNISOB LEADER 03975nam 2200565 450 001 9910820121303321 005 20230803213429.0 010 $a0-87609-612-7 035 $a(CKB)3710000000445816 035 $a(EBL)3425947 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001521354 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12631008 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001521354 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11532717 035 $a(PQKB)10101797 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3425947 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000445816 100 $a20150725h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aStrategic stability in the second nuclear age /$fGregory D. Koblentz 210 1$aNew York, New York :$cCouncil on Foreign Relations,$d2014. 210 4$d©2014 215 $a1 online resource (65 p.) 225 1 $aCouncil Special Report ;$vNumber 71 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-87609-611-9 311 $a0-87609-613-5 327 $aContents; Foreword; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Strategic Landscape of the Second Nuclear Age; Challenges to Strategic Stability; Conclusion and Policy Recommendations; Endnotes; About the Author; Advisory Committee for Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age; Council Special Reports 330 $a"During the Cold War, the potential for nuclear weapons to be used was determined largely by the United States and the Soviet Union. Now, with 16,300 weapons possessed by the seven established nuclear-armed states -- China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- deterrence is increasingly complex. Since most of these countries face threats from a number of potential adversaries, changes in one state's nuclear policy can have a cascading effect on the other states. Though many states are downsizing their stockpiles, Asia is witnessing a buildup; Pakistan has the fastest-growing nuclear program in the world. By 2020, it could have a stockpile of fissile material that, if weaponized, could produce as many as two hundred nuclear devices. The author identifies South Asia as the region 'most at risk of a breakdown in strategic stability due to an explosive mixture of unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border terrorism, and growing nuclear arsenals'. Emerging technologies such as missile defenses, cyber and antisatellite weapons, and conventional precision strike weapons pose additional risks, Koblentz warns, and could potentially spur arms races and trigger crises. The United States should work with other nuclear states to address sources of instability in the near term and establish processes for multilateral arms control efforts over the longer term, writes Koblentz. He urges the Obama administration to enhance initiatives that foster transparency, confidence-building, and restraint to mitigate the risk that emerging technologies will trigger arms races, threaten the survivability of nuclear forces, or undermine early warning and nuclear command and control systems; deepen bilateral and multilateral dialogues with the other nuclear-armed states; and create a forum for the seven established nuclear-armed states to discuss further steps to reduce the risk of deliberate, accidental, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons"--Publisher's web site. 410 0$aCSR (New York, N.Y.) ;$vNumber 71. 606 $aStrategic forces 606 $aNuclear nonproliferation 606 $aDeterrence (Strategy) 615 0$aStrategic forces. 615 0$aNuclear nonproliferation. 615 0$aDeterrence (Strategy) 676 $a355.0217 700 $aKoblentz$b Gregory D.$f1974-$01610019 712 02$aCouncil on Foreign Relations, 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aREPORT 912 $a9910820121303321 996 $aStrategic stability in the second nuclear age$93993521 997 $aUNINA