LEADER 03256nam 2200649 a 450 001 9910820103403321 005 20240418004328.0 010 $a1-283-15062-X 010 $a9786613150622 010 $a0-300-17182-X 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300171822 035 $a(CKB)2670000000095631 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH24487460 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000523939 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11332677 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000523939 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10543277 035 $a(PQKB)10084266 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3420701 035 $a(DE-B1597)486352 035 $a(OCoLC)738478532 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300171822 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3420701 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10480871 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL315062 035 $a(OCoLC)923596127 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000095631 100 $a20101020d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLocal redistribution and local democracy $einterest groups and the courts /$fClayton P. Gillette 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aNew Haven $cYale University Press$dc2011 215 $axiii, 235 p 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-300-12565-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aThe scope of local competence -- Why does local autonomy matter? -- The meaning and scope of local redistribution -- Why do local governments redistribute? -- Local political markets and state constitutional constraints -- Proxies for distinguishing benign and malign redistribution -- The limits of judicial intervention -- Conclusion. 330 $aThe traditional theory of urban finance argues against local redistribution of wealth on the assumption that such action is likely to chase away the relatively wealthy, leaving only the impoverished behind. Nevertheless, Clayton P. Gillette observes, local governments engage in substantial redistribution, both to the wealthy and to the poor.In this thoughtful book, Gillette examines whether recent campaigns to enact "living wage" ordinances and other local redistributive programs represent gaps in the traditional theory or political opportunism. He then investigates the role of the courts in distinguishing between these explanations. The author argues that courts have greater capacity to review local programs than is typically assumed. He concludes that when a single interest group dominates the political process, judicial intervention to determine a program's legal validity may be appropriate. But if the political contest involves competing groups, courts should defer to local political judgments. 606 $aDistribution (Economic theory) 606 $aLocal government$zUnited States 606 $aLocal finance$zUnited States 615 0$aDistribution (Economic theory) 615 0$aLocal government 615 0$aLocal finance 676 $a339.20973 700 $aGillette$b Clayton P$0456214 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910820103403321 996 $aLocal redistribution and local democracy$93948107 997 $aUNINA