LEADER 03906nam 2200757Ia 450 001 9910819972103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-107-23104-3 010 $a1-139-23460-9 010 $a1-280-64716-7 010 $a9786613633217 010 $a1-139-23314-9 010 $a1-139-23092-1 010 $a1-139-23237-1 010 $a1-139-22947-8 010 $a1-139-23392-0 010 $a1-139-09402-5 035 $a(CKB)2670000000172034 035 $a(EBL)880756 035 $a(OCoLC)794327756 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000622495 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11385810 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000622495 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10643645 035 $a(PQKB)10094186 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139094023 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC880756 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL880756 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10565007 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL363321 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000172034 100 $a20111109d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aCorruption and reform in India $epublic services in the digital age /$fJennifer Bussell 210 $aCambridge ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (xiii, 306 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-62786-9 311 $a1-107-01905-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a1. Introduction -- 2. Explaining the politics of technology-enabled public services -- 3. Do reforms affect the quality of services? -- 4. Policy initiation in the Indian states -- 5. The scope of reform I: patterns of policy implementation -- 6. The scope of reform II: coalition governments -- 7. From "petty" to "grand" corruption: ownership, management, and the scale of reform -- 8. Technology-enabled administrative reforms in cross-national perspective -- 9. Conclusion. 330 $aWhy do some governments improve public services more effectively than others? Through the investigation of a new era of administrative reform, in which digital technologies may be used to facilitate citizens' access to the state, Jennifer Bussell's analysis provides unanticipated insights into this fundamental question. In contrast to factors such as economic development or electoral competition, this study highlights the importance of access to rents, which can dramatically shape the opportunities and threats of reform to political elites. Drawing on a sub-national analysis of twenty Indian states, a field experiment, statistical modeling, case studies, interviews of citizens, bureaucrats and politicians, and comparative data from South Africa and Brazil, Bussell shows that the extent to which politicians rely on income from petty and grand corruption is closely linked to variation in the timing, management and comprehensiveness of reforms. 606 $aPublic administration$xCorrupt practices$zIndia 606 $aPolitical corruption$zIndia 606 $aPublic administration$xCorrupt practices$zIndia$xPrevention 606 $aPolitical corruption$zIndia$xPrevention 606 $aAdministrative agencies$zIndia$xReorganization 615 0$aPublic administration$xCorrupt practices 615 0$aPolitical corruption 615 0$aPublic administration$xCorrupt practices$xPrevention. 615 0$aPolitical corruption$xPrevention. 615 0$aAdministrative agencies$xReorganization. 676 $a352.3/50954 686 $aPOL000000$2bisacsh 700 $aBussell$b Jennifer$f1975-$01716076 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910819972103321 996 $aCorruption and reform in India$94111192 997 $aUNINA