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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aPutting trust in the US budget $efederal trust funds and the politics of commitment /$fEric M. Patashnik
205   $a1st ed.
210   $aCambridge [England] ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$d2000
215   $a1 online resource (xiv, 231 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
225 1 $aTheories of institutional design
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-77748-8 
311   $a0-511-01678-6 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 205-225) and index.
327   $aIntroduction: trust funds and the politics of commitment -- Political transaction costs, feedback effects, and policy credibility -- Trust fund taxes vs. general fund taxes -- Social security -- Medicare -- Highways -- Airports -- Superfund -- Barriers to trust fund adoption: the failed cases of energy security and lead abatement -- Conclusions: The structure and normative challenge of promise-keeping.
330   $aIn the United States many important programs are paid from trust funds. At a time when major social insurance funds are facing insolvency, this book provided the first comprehensive study of this significant yet little-studied feature of the American welfare state. Equally importantly, the author investigates an enduring issue in democratic politics: can current officeholders bind their successors? By law, trust funds, which get most of their money from earmarked taxes, are restricted for specific uses. Patashnik asks why these structures were created, and how they have affected political dynamics. He argues that officeholders have used trust funds primarily to reduce political uncertainty, and bind distant futures. Based on detailed case studies of trust funds in a number of policy sectors, he shows how political commitment is a developmental process, whereby precommitments shape the content of future political conflicts. This book will be of interest to students of public policy, political economy and American political development.
410  0$aTheories of institutional design.
517 3 $aFederal trust funds and the politics of commitment
606   $aPension trusts$zUnited States
606   $aSocial security$zUnited States
606   $aInfrastructure (Economics)$zUnited States$xFinance
606   $aBudget$zUnited States
615  0$aPension trusts
615  0$aSocial security
615  0$aInfrastructure (Economics)$xFinance.
615  0$aBudget
676   $a336.73
700   $aPatashnik$b Eric M$0865798
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910819939503321
996   $aPutting trust in the US budget$94012134
997   $aUNINA