LEADER 04081nam 22006495 450 001 9910819901503321 005 20210114050308.0 010 $a1-282-53160-3 010 $a9786612531606 010 $a1-4008-3559-3 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400835591 035 $a(CKB)2550000000007419 035 $a(EBL)485783 035 $a(OCoLC)593342182 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000340213 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11252231 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000340213 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10387117 035 $a(PQKB)10266185 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36502 035 $a(DE-B1597)446645 035 $a(OCoLC)979593291 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400835591 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC485783 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000007419 100 $a20190708d2009 fg 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMathematics and Democracy $eDesigning Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures /$fSteven J. Brams 205 $aCourse Book 210 1$aPrinceton, NJ : $cPrinceton University Press, $d[2009] 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (390 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-13321-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [343]-362) and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tPart 1. Voting Procedures -- $t1 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice -- $t2 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Theory -- $t3 Electing a Single Winner: Combining Approval and Preference -- $t4 Electing Multiple Winners: Constrained Approval Voting -- $t5 Electing Multiple Winners: The Minimax Procedure -- $t6 Electing Multiple Winners: Minimizing Misrepresentation -- $t7 Selecting Winners in Multiple Elections -- $tPart 2. Fair- Division Procedures -- $t8 Selecting a Governing Coalition in a Parliament -- $t9 Allocating Cabinet Ministries in a Parliament -- $t10 Allocating Indivisible Goods: Help the Worst- Off or Avoid Envy? -- $t11 Allocating a Single Homogeneous Divisible Good: Divide- the- Dollar -- $t12 Allocating Multiple Homogeneous Divisible Goods: Adjusted Winner -- $t13 Allocating a Single Heterogeneous Good: Cutting a Cake -- $t14 Allocating Divisible and Indivisible Goods -- $t15 Summary and Conclusions -- $tGlossary -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aVoters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods. 606 $aFinance, Public$xMathematical models 606 $aElections$xMathematical models 606 $aVoting$xMathematical models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aFinance, Public$xMathematical models. 615 0$aElections$xMathematical models. 615 0$aVoting$xMathematical models. 676 $a324.601513 686 $a89.57$2bcl 700 $aBrams$b Steven J., $045246 801 0$bDE-B1597 801 1$bDE-B1597 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910819901503321 996 $aMathematics and Democracy$94093896 997 $aUNINA