LEADER 03268nam 2200565 450 001 9910819869003321 005 20230803195619.0 010 $a3-8382-5407-4 035 $a(CKB)2670000000547952 035 $a(EBL)3029479 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001471116 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11809316 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001471116 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11433646 035 $a(PQKB)10958430 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5781941 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000547952 100 $a20150210h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMarket without economy $ethe 1998 Russian financial crisis /$fNicola Melloni ; with a foreword by Eiji Furukawa 210 1$aStuttgart, Germany :$cIbidem-Verlag,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (156 p.) 225 1 $aSoviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society,$x1614-3515 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-89821-407-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""List of Tables""; ""List of Figures""; ""Acknowledgements""; ""Foreword""; ""Introduction""; ""I The Russian Stabilisation Programme""; ""I.1 Initial Considerations""; ""I.2 The Case of Russia""; ""I.3 Macroeconomic Aspects""; ""Monetary Policy""; ""Fiscal Policy""; ""I.4 The Microeconomics of Stabilisation""; ""I.5 Conclusions""; ""II Russian Default and Financial Crisis Theory""; ""II.1 Theoretical Background""; ""First Generation Model""; ""Second Generation Model""; ""Third Generation Model""; ""The Contagion Effect""; ""II.2 The Russian Financial Crisis"" 327 $a""Literature Review""""Setting the Stage: What Was Happening in 1998""; ""The Crisis Itself""; ""II.3 Conclusion""; ""III The Aftermath of the Crisis""; ""III.1 Introduction""; ""III.2 Growth and Inflation""; ""III.3 Microeconomic Effects of the Crisis""; ""III.4 Public Finances""; ""III.5 Final Considerations""; ""Conclusions""; ""Appendix""; ""Bibliography"" 330 $aThe 1998 financial crisis in Russia was one of the most dramatic economic breakdowns and symbolized the failure of the transition process as it had been conducted since the end of the Soviet Union. There is no general agreement on the nature of the rouble collapse; a number of contradictory interpretations have been discussed among economists. This book argues that the Russian 1998 financial turmoil is best predicted by Krugman's and Sargent-Wallace's models. The currency collapse had its origins in the peculiar way in which the transition was managed. In particular, the Russian government bec 410 0$aSoviet and post-Soviet politics and society. 606 $aFinancial crises$zRussia (Federation) 606 $aBanks and banking$zRussia (Federation) 607 $aRussia (Federation)$xEconomic policy$y1991- 615 0$aFinancial crises 615 0$aBanks and banking 676 $a330.947 700 $aMelloni$b Nicola$01662507 702 $aFurukawa$b Eiji 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910819869003321 996 $aMarket without economy$94019254 997 $aUNINA