LEADER 03943nam 2200697Ia 450 001 9910819591403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-674-26287-5 010 $a0-674-03677-8 024 7 $a10.4159/9780674036772 035 $a(CKB)1000000000805557 035 $a(OCoLC)657981386 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10326110 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000482789 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11341250 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000482789 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10529205 035 $a(PQKB)10075052 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001588674 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16274890 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001588674 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14872519 035 $a(PQKB)10284809 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3300565 035 $a(DE-B1597)457613 035 $a(OCoLC)1049624422 035 $a(OCoLC)1054878018 035 $a(OCoLC)979721324 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674036772 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3300565 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10326110 035 $a(OCoLC)923111860 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000805557 100 $a20021003d2003 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aArmed servants $eagency, oversight, and civil-military relations /$fPeter D. Feaver 210 $aCambridge, MA $cHarvard University Press$d2003 215 $a1 online resource (396 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-674-01051-5 311 $a0-674-01761-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tCHAPTER 1. Introduction --$tCHAPTER 2. Huntington's Cold War Puzzle --$tCHAPTER 3. The Informal Agency Theory --$tCHAPTER 4. A Formal Agency Model of Civil-Military Relations --$tCHAPTER 5. An Agency Theory Solution to the Cold War Puzzle --$tCHAPTER 6. Explaining the Post-Cold War "Crisis," 1990-2000 --$tCHAPTER 7. Using Agency Theory to Explore the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era --$tCHAPTER 8. Conclusion --$tNotes --$tReferences --$tIndex 330 $aHow do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future. 606 $aCivil-military relations$zUnited States 606 $aCivil supremacy over the military$zUnited States 615 0$aCivil-military relations 615 0$aCivil supremacy over the military 676 $a322.50973 700 $aFeaver$b Peter$01755426 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910819591403321 996 $aArmed servants$94203813 997 $aUNINA