LEADER 05380nam 2200697Ia 450 001 9910819021403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-28561-0 010 $a9786612285615 010 $a0-08-092293-7 035 $a(CKB)1000000000790103 035 $a(EBL)453046 035 $a(OCoLC)528581488 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000289456 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12086575 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000289456 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10401377 035 $a(PQKB)10475772 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL453046 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10329522 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL228561 035 $a(PPN)170260399 035 $a(OCoLC)850605845 035 $a(OCoLC)ocn850605845 035 $a(FR-PaCSA)45002268 035 $a(CaSebORM)9780123745071 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC453046 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000790103 100 $a20090713d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAuction theory /$fVijay Krishna 205 $a2nd ed. 210 $aBoston $cElsevier Academic Press$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (337 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-12-374507-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 305-313) and index. 327 $aFront Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication Page; Table of Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1.1 Some Common Auction Forms; 1.2 Valuations; 1.3 Equivalent Auctions; 1.4 Revenue versus Efficiency; 1.5 What Is an Auction?; 1.6 Outline of Part I; Part I: Single-Object Auctions; Chapter 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look; 2.1 The Symmetric Model; 2.2 Second-Price Auctions; 2.3 First-Price Auctions; 2.4 Revenue Comparison; 2.5 Reserve Prices; Chapter 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle; 3.1 Main Result; 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle 327 $a3.2.1 Unusual Auctions3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders; Chapter 4. Qualifications and Extensions; 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders; 4.2 Budget Constraints; 4.2.1 Second-Price Auctions; 4.2.2 First-Price Auctions; 4.2.3 Revenue Comparison; 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders; 4.3.1 Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders; 4.3.2 Revenue Comparison; 4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison; 4.4 Resale and Efficiency; Chapter 5. Mechanism Design; 5.1 Mechanisms; 5.1.1 The Revelation Principle; 5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility; 5.1.3 Individual Rationality; 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms; 5.2.1 Setup; 5.2.2 Solution 327 $a5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms; 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms; 5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism; 5.3.2 Budget Balance; 5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade; Chapter 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values; 6.1 The Symmetric Model; 6.2 Second-Price Auctions; 6.3 English Auctions; 6.4 First-Price Auctions; 6.5 Revenue Comparisons; 6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions; 6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions; 6.6 Efficiency; Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; 7.1 The Main Result; 7.2 Public Information; 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle 327 $aChapter 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle; 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions; 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders; 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees; Chapter 9. Efficiency and the English Auction; 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition; 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions; 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition; 9.4 Three or More Bidders; 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2; 9.6 Miscellany; Chapter 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms; 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms; Chapter 11. Bidding Rings 327 $a11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions11.1.1 Efficient Collusion; 11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion; 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions; Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions; Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions; 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units; 12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions; 12.1.2 Uniform-Price Auctions; 12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions; 12.2 Some Open Auctions; 12.2.1 Dutch Auctions; 12.2.2 English Auctions; 12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions; Chapter 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; 13.1 The Basic Model; 13.2 Vickrey Auctions 327 $a13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions 330 $aVijay Krishna's 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves 606 $aAuctions$xMathematical models 606 $aGame theory 615 0$aAuctions$xMathematical models. 615 0$aGame theory. 676 $a381/.1701 700 $aKrishna$b Vijay$0383824 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910819021403321 996 $aAuction theory$9263819 997 $aUNINA