LEADER 05264nam 2200649 a 450 001 9910819006603321 005 20240313233236.0 010 $a1-118-60909-3 010 $a1-118-60908-5 010 $a1-118-60910-7 035 $a(CKB)2560000000103666 035 $a(EBL)1213811 035 $a(OCoLC)851316214 035 $a(OCoLC)844775016 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1213811 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1213811 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10719160 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL497747 035 $a(OCoLC)892335991 035 $a(PPN)203365119 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000103666 100 $a20150303d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aRationality through reasoning /$fJohn Broome 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aChichester, West Sussex, U.K. $cWiley-Blackwell$dc2013 215 $a1 online resource (324 p.) 225 1 $aThe Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy ;$v4 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4051-1710-9 311 $a1-118-65605-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Preface; 1: Introduction; 1.1 Motivation; Rationality and reasoning; 1.2 This book; Metaphysics; Notes; 2: Ought; 2.1 The meaning of 'ought'; 2.2 Normative and non-normative oughts; Natural normativity; 2.3 Owned and unowned oughts; The propositional ought; Unowned oughts; Ownership and agency; Owned oughts are central; Enkrasia and defining the central ought; 2.4 Qualified and unqualified oughts; Requirements; Qualified oughts and the central ought; Notes; 3: Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts; 3.1 Sidgwick's View; 3.2 The need to decide 327 $a3.3 Objective and prospective oughtsProspect consequentialism and the prospective ought; Outcome consequentialism and the objective ought; 3.4 Valuing prospects; 3.5 Summary; Notes; 4: Reasons; 4.1 Introduction and preliminaries; Explanation; 4.2 Pro toto reasons; 4.3 Pro tanto reasons; Defining a pro tanto reason; Counting in favour; Examples of weighing explanations; Buck-passing; Is there always a weighing explanation?; Permissible and obligatory; Reasons of other sorts; 4.4 Most reason; 4.5 Ownership of reasons; Nagel: agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons; Why Nagel's definition? 327 $aNotes5: Responding to Reasons; 5.1 Rationality and responding to reasons; Responding correctly to reasons; 5.2 The quick objection; 5.3 Attitudinal reasons; Ignorance is no excuse; Responding correctly to attitudinal reasons; Conflicting attitudinal reasons; Example; There are no attitudinal reasons; 5.4 Sufficiency of reasons; Reasons of rationality; Rationality through worldly reasons; Notes; 6: Responding to Reason-Beliefs; 6.1 The Enkratic Condition; 6.2 Meeting your own standards; First objection; Objection to the Direct Enkratic Condition; Scanlon's condition; Scanlon's argument 327 $a6.3 Responding correctly to P-beliefsAn example; Practical reasons; When you have no conflicting normative belief; Conclusion; 6.4 Conclusion; Notes; 7: Requirements; 7.1 Two sorts of requirement; 7.2 Property requirements; Interpretations; Logic; 7.3 Source requirements; Formalities; Source requirements are local; 7.4 Logic for requirements?; Axiom K; Inheritance; Logical Equivalents; Axiom D; Necessary Detachment; Transmission; 7.5 Ought; Deontic logic; Normative transmission; Notes; 8: Conditional Requirements; 8.1 Application and content 327 $aProperties corresponding to conditional requirements8.2 Conditional requirements of rationality; Jurisdiction; Scope; Inconsistent requirements; Asymmetry; Basing prohibitions; Alternative accounts of the asymmetry; Dyadic requirements; Diachronic requirements; The normativity of rationality; Notes; Appendix to Chapter 8; Theorem; Proof; 9: Synchronic Rationality; 9.1 Introduction and method; Method; Rationality supervenes on the mind: taking means to your end; Wide scope; Synchronic requirements; Psychological limitations; 9.2 Consistency; 9.3 Deduction; 9.4 Instrumental Rationality 327 $aMeans implied 330 $aRationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thoughtIncludes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens i 410 0$aBlackwell/Brown lectures in philosophy ;$v4. 606 $aReasoning 606 $aPractical reason 615 0$aReasoning. 615 0$aPractical reason. 676 $a153.4/3 700 $aBroome$b John$f1947-$0930069 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910819006603321 996 $aRationality through reasoning$94016774 997 $aUNINA