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200 10$aCorporate governance in the common-law world $ethe political foundations of shareholder power /$fChristopher M. Bruner, Washington and Lee University School of Law$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2013.
215   $a1 online resource (xiii, 300 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a1-107-45943-5 
311   $a1-107-01329-1 
327   $aPart I. Shareholder Orientation in the Common-Law World: -- 1. Introduction and overview -- 2. Comparative theory and corporate governance -- 3. The corporate governance role of shareholders in common-law jurisdictions -- Part II. A Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: -- 4. Comparative theories of corporate governance -- 5. Shareholders, stakeholders, and social welfare policy -- Part III. The Theory's Explanatory Domain: -- 6. Stability, change, and the future of corporate governance in the common-law world.
330   $aThe corporate governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States are often characterized as a single 'Anglo-American' system prioritizing shareholders' interests over those of other corporate stakeholders. Such generalizations, however, obscure substantial differences across the common-law world. Contrary to popular belief, shareholders in the United Kingdom and jurisdictions following its lead are far more powerful and central to the aims of the corporation than are shareholders in the United States. This book presents a new comparative theory to explain this divergence and explores the theory's ramifications for law and public policy. Bruner argues that regulatory structures affecting other stakeholders' interests - notably differing degrees of social welfare protection for employees - have decisively impacted the degree of political opposition to shareholder-centric policies across the common-law world. These dynamics remain powerful forces today, and understanding them will be vital as post-crisis reforms continue to take shape.
606   $aCorporate governance$xLaw and legislation
606   $aCommon law
615  0$aCorporate governance$xLaw and legislation.
615  0$aCommon law.
676   $a346/.0666
700   $aBruner$b Christopher M.$f1972-$01129344
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910818901003321
996   $aCorporate governance in the common-law world$93981947
997   $aUNINA