LEADER 05685oam 2200793I 450 001 9910818653403321 005 20240131152359.0 010 $a1-136-25775-6 010 $a1-283-70926-0 010 $a0-203-10642-3 010 $a1-136-25776-4 024 7 $a10.4324/9780203106426 035 $a(CKB)2670000000269523 035 $a(EBL)1047200 035 $a(OCoLC)818114871 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000757767 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11437609 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000757767 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10772003 035 $a(PQKB)10532875 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1047200 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1047200 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10617663 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL402176 035 $a(OCoLC)874447378 035 $a(FINmELB)ELB134879 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000269523 100 $a20180706d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDeath, posthumous harm, and bioethics /$fJames Stacey Taylor 210 1$aNew York :$cRoutledge,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (243 p.) 225 1 $aRoutledge annals of bioethics ;$v12 225 0$aRoutledge annals of bioethics ;$v12 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-138-89157-6 311 $a0-415-51884-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 205-221) and index. 327 $aCover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Death Unterrible; Full-blooded Epicureanism and Contemporary Bioethics; A Note on Methodology; Outline of this Volume; 1 Posthumous Harm and Interest-based Accounts of Well-being; The Intuitive Case for Posthumous Harm; The Anti-Hedonistic Intuition; Wronging the Dead; The Feinberg-Pitcher Argument for Posthumous Harm; Assessing the Argument for Posthumous Harm; Accommodating Orphaned Intuitions; Accommodating Feinberg's and Parfit's Anti-Hedonistic Intuitions; Can the Dead be Wronged? 327 $aPortmore, Posthumous Harm, and the Desire Theory of WelfareConclusion; 2 Further Criticisms of the Possibility of Posthumous Harm; Levenbook's Account of Harm as Loss; Levenbook's Argument; Criticisms of Levenbook's Argument; Grover's Quality of Life Arguments; Grover's Argument; Criticisms of Grover's Argument; Sperling's Human Subject Account; Sperling's Argument; Criticisms of Sperling's Argument; Harm and Implication in Evil; Conclusion; 3 The Impossibility of Posthumous Harm; Death, Goods, and the Extinction of Desires; Responding to Luper; Towards Hedonism; Objects and Causes 327 $aConclusion4 Can the Dead Be Wronged?; Desert and Injustice; Blustein and the "Dear Departed"; Responses to Blustein's Arguments; Response to the Rescue from Insignificance Argument; Response to the Enduring Duties Argument; Response to the Reciprocity Argument; Rights and Interests; Conclusion; 5 Why Death Is Not a Harm to the One Who Dies; The Epicurean Argument; Hedonism Revisited; Death and Deprivation; Does a Person's Death Deprive Her of the Goods of Life?; Responses to these Deprivation-based Arguments for the Harm of Death; The Existence Variant and Presentism Defended; Conclusion 327 $a6 Fearless SymmetryLucretian Arguments; Challenges to the Lucretian Symmetry Argument; Responses to Nagel's Objection; Stoic fate; Hetherington's Symmetry Arguments; Earlier Birth and Personal Identity; Kaufman's Defense of Nagel's Argument; Responses to Kaufman; Responses to the Other Criticisms of this Lucretian Argument; The Backfire Problem; Feldman's Objection; Parfit's Hospital Example; Conclusion; 7 Epicureanism, Suicide, and Euthanasia; McMahan's Reconciliation Strategy; An Epicurean Approach to Suicide and Euthanasia; Suicide; Euthanasia; Conclusion 327 $a8 Epicureanism and Organ ProcurementEpicureanism and Policies of Presumed Consent; Presumed Consent and the "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Gill's Arguments; Why Gill's Argument against the Qualitative "Fewer Mistakes" Argument Fails; Objections to Gill's Quantitative Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Argument; The "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments and Violations of Autonomy; Presumed Consent and Respect for Autonomy; From Presumed Consent to Organ Taking; The Standard Pro-Taking Argument; Two Unjustified Assumptions-Moving Towards Markets 327 $aThe Ownership of Organs 330 $aDeath, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues. Taylor defends the controversial Epicurean view that death is not a harm to the person who dies and the neo-Epicurean thesis that persons cannot be affected by events that occur after their deaths, and hence that posthumous harms (and benefits) are impossible. He then extends this argument by asserting that the dead cannot be wronged, finally presenting a de 410 0$aRoutledge Annals of Bioethics 606 $aDeath 606 $aDeath$xMoral and ethical aspects 606 $aRespect for persons 606 $aDead 606 $aBioethics 615 0$aDeath. 615 0$aDeath$xMoral and ethical aspects. 615 0$aRespect for persons. 615 0$aDead. 615 0$aBioethics. 676 $a128/.5 700 $aTaylor$b James Stacey$f1970-,$01707219 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910818653403321 996 $aDeath, posthumous harm, and bioethics$94095253 997 $aUNINA