LEADER 05925nam 2200601Ia 450 001 9910818298103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-281-98096-X 010 $a9786611980962 010 $a0-19-151964-2 035 $a(CKB)2440000000012751 035 $a(OCoLC)252582922 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10274543 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000301135 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11265135 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000301135 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10259425 035 $a(PQKB)10382789 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3052856 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3052856 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10274543 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL198096 035 $a(OCoLC)922953868 035 $a(EXLCZ)992440000000012751 100 $a19900308d1990 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aKnowledge and the state of nature $ean essay in conceptual synthesis /$fEdward Craig 210 $aOxford $cClarendon Press ;$aNew York $cOxford University Press$d1990 215 $a1 online resource (182 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 0 $a0-19-824243-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [168]-169) and index. 327 $aIntro -- Contents -- I: Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State-of-Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology. -- II: Derivation of first condition -- the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case. -- III: Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis. -- IV: Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice. -- V: Distinction between Informant and Source of Information -- its nature and point. Application to putative 'knowledge without belief cases -- and to comparativism: Goldman. -- VI: Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle. -- VII: Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn. -- VIII: Externalist and Internalist analyses. The firstperson case. Knowing that one knows. -- IX: Insufficiency of the various analyses. The 'No false lemma' principle. Its rationale-and its effect. -- X: Objectivisation. The 'cart before the horse' objection-and the response. -- XI: Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws. -- XII: Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account. -- XIII: Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective. -- XIV: Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?. -- XV: Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker. -- XVI: Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London-and German. -- XVII: Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. 'Knows how to' compared with 'can'-and with 'knows that'. -- Appendix: Unger's Semantic Relativism. 327 $aReferences -- Index of Names. 330 $aEdward Craig argues that the standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge has radical defects, and he offers a more illuminating approach, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs that it fulfils.`one of the most inspired works of epistemology in several decades, a compact masterpiece sketching a new way to do epistemology and brimming with illuminating concrete proposals' Mind -;The standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge has radical defects in its arbitrary restriction of the subject matter, and in its risky theoretical presuppositions. Edward Craig suggests a more illuminating approach, akin to the 'state of nature' method found in political theory, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs that it fulfils. Light is thrown on much that philosophers have written aboutknowledge, about its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis (such as the counter-examples of Edmund Gettier), and on the debate over scepticism. It becomes apparent why many languages not only have such constructions as 'knows whether' and 'knows that', but also have equivalaents of 'knows how to'and 'know' followed by a direct object. Thus the inquiry is both broadened in scope and made theoretically less fragile.'In a study full of lively, subtle, clever ideas Edward Craig gives fresh impetus to a debate which until lately had seemed stalled.' A. C. Grayling, Times Literary Supplement'I greatly enjoyed this elegant little book. It is written with a light touch, unfailingly intelligent, fair, and lively. It also has something interesting to say. Would that all epistemology could be like this!' Jonathan Dancy, Philosophical Quarterly'far-ranging and strikingly original . . . I regard his approach as extremely 330 8 $apromising. Craig has written one of the most inspired works of epistemology in several decades, a compact masterpiece sketching a new way to do epistemology and brimming with illuminating concrete proposals. The book is powerfully, densely argued, and it is exquisitely written. Any future work in epistemology must reckon with this unique book.' Frederick F. Schmitt, Mind. 606 $aKnowledge, Theory of 606 $aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy 615 0$aKnowledge, Theory of. 615 0$aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy. 676 $a121 700 $aCraig$b Edward$f1942-$01715622 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910818298103321 996 $aKnowledge and the state of nature$94110437 997 $aUNINA