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100   $a20030603d2004      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aElectoral engineering $evoting rules and political behavior /$fPippa Norris
205   $a1st ed.
210   $aCambridge, UK ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$d2004
215   $a1 online resource (xi, 375 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-53671-5 
311   $a0-521-82977-1 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 265-345) and index.
327   $aCover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Tables and Figures; Preface; PART I INTRODUCTION; PART II THE CONSEQUENCES FOR VOTING BEHAVIOR; PART III THE CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION; PART IV CONCLUSIONS; Bibliography; Notes; Index
330   $aFrom Kosovo to Kabul, the last decade witnessed growing interest in ?electoral engineering?. Reformers have sought to achieve either greater government accountability through majoritarian arrangements or wider parliamentary diversity through proportional formula. Underlying the normative debates are important claims about the impact and consequences of electoral reform for political representation and voting behavior. The study compares and evaluates two broad schools of thought, each offering contracting expectations. One popular approach claims that formal rules define electoral incentives facing parties, politicians and citizens. By changing these rules, rational choice institutionalism claims that we have the capacity to shape political behavior. Alternative cultural modernization theories differ in their emphasis on the primary motors driving human behavior, their expectations about the pace of change, and also their assumptions about the ability of formal institutional rules to alter, rather than adapt to, deeply embedded and habitual social norms and patterns of human behavior.
606   $aElections
606   $aVoting
606   $aParty affiliation
606   $aRepresentative government and representation
606   $aComparative government
615  0$aElections.
615  0$aVoting.
615  0$aParty affiliation.
615  0$aRepresentative government and representation.
615  0$aComparative government.
676   $a324.6/3
700   $aNorris$b Pippa$0144668
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910818214203321
996   $aElectoral engineering$93998963
997   $aUNINA