LEADER 06212oam 22011174 450 001 9910818147903321 005 20240402050354.0 010 $a1-4623-5680-X 010 $a1-4527-8237-7 010 $a9786612841286 010 $a1-282-84128-9 010 $a1-4518-7035-3 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055069 035 $a(EBL)1607940 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943997 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11473540 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943997 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10983801 035 $a(PQKB)10413346 035 $a(OCoLC)762093397 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2008177 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607940 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055069 100 $a20020129d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aConsumer Confusion : $eThe Choice of AFORE /$fMoisés Schwartz, Enrique Domínguez, Roberto Calderón-Colín 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (63 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/177 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1488-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. The Choice of AFORE in Mexico; A. Inelasticity of Demand and Switching among Fund Managers; Figures; 1. Switches; 2. Turnover Ratio for Mexico and Chile; Tables; 1. Regression Analysis 1; 2. Regression Analysis 2; 3. Switches In 2006; 4. Gain or Loss after Switching Workers' Estimated Balance at the Age of Retirement; 5. Gain or Loss after Switching Workers' Estimated Balance after a Five-Year Period; 6. Loss from not Switching to the to the "Optimal" AFORE Workers' Estimated Balance at the Age of Retirement 327 $a7. Loss from not Switching to the "Optimal" AFORE Workers' Estimated Balance after a Five-Year Period B. The Effectiveness of an Increase in Supply; 3. Gain/Loss in Balances for Hypothetical Cases of Workers that began accruing; 4. Winners and Losers Due to Decreases in Fees; 5. Changes in Balances Due to Decreases in Fees; III. Consumer's "Confusion" and "Noise"; A. Theoretical Framework; B. Statistical Analysis of Possible "Noise" Distributions 327 $a8. "Noise Distribution" Percentage Loss in Pension Balances at Retirement Age Due to "Sub-Optimal" Choice of AFORE Fitted by the Normal and Weibull Distributions.9. "Noise Distribution" Percentage Loss in Pension Balances After A Five-year Period Due to "Sub-Optimal" Choice of AFORE Fitted By The Normal and Weibull Distributions; C. Mark-up Estimation in the AFORE Industry; 6. Mark-up According to the Number of AFOREs; IV. Empirical Study; A. Measurement of "Noise" and Consumer "Confusion"; B. Econometric Framework to Measure "Confusion's " Relative Importance; C. Empirical Results 327 $aV. Concluding Remarks Annexes; I. The Model; II. Questionnaires; References 330 3 $aThis paper was prepared for the World Bank 4th Annual Contractual Savings Conference (Washington DC, April 2008) co-organized by Gregorio Impavido (gimpavido@imf.org). The article shows that account transfers among pension administrators in Mexico barely respond to price or return considerations and in general has not improved the consumer's pension balance. Instead of strengthening competition through lower fees and higher returns for the consumer, AFORE switching has so far undermined the system and resulted in the destruction of value. Moreover, "noisy" evaluations of the product by the consumer tend to undermine the power of competition. Thus, an increased number of pension fund managers has not provided a more competitive environment. The theoretical framework allows for the estimation of "noise" and mark-ups in the AFORE industry. As the number of AFOREs increases, the mark-up diminishes at a very slow rate. This implies that more participants in the industry will hardly affect prices. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/177 606 $aPension trusts$zMexico$xManagement$xEconometric models 606 $aCompetition$zMexico$xEconometric models 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aLabor$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aSocial Security and Public Pensions$2imf 606 $aNonwage Labor Costs and Benefits$2imf 606 $aPrivate Pensions$2imf 606 $aRetirement$2imf 606 $aRetirement Policies$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf 606 $aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General$2imf 606 $aPensions$2imf 606 $aLabour$2imf 606 $aincome economics$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aPension spending$2imf 606 $aCompetition$2imf 606 $aExpenditure$2imf 606 $aExpenditures, Public$2imf 607 $aMexico$2imf 615 0$aPension trusts$xManagement$xEconometric models. 615 0$aCompetition$xEconometric models. 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aLabor 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aSocial Security and Public Pensions 615 7$aNonwage Labor Costs and Benefits 615 7$aPrivate Pensions 615 7$aRetirement 615 7$aRetirement Policies 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) 615 7$aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General 615 7$aPensions 615 7$aLabour 615 7$aincome economics 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aPension spending 615 7$aCompetition 615 7$aExpenditure 615 7$aExpenditures, Public 676 $a332.67254 700 $aSchwartz$b Moisés$01610661 701 $aDomínguez$b Enrique$01610662 701 $aCalderón-Colín$b Roberto$01610663 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910818147903321 996 $aConsumer Confusion$93938500 997 $aUNINA