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100   $a20180706d2011      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aLegitimacy and the use of armed force $estability missions in the post-Cold War era /$fChiyuki Aoi
210  1$aMilton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, [England] ;$aNew York :$cRoutledge,$d2011.
215   $a1 online resource (302 p.)
225 1 $aContemporary security studies
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a0-415-51003-1 
311   $a0-415-55954-5 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aBook Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; 1 Legitimacy in stability operations; 2 Liberia: Creating peace in Africa; 3 Bosnia-Herzegovina: From peace support to coercive diplomacy; 4 Somalia: From peace enforcement to disengagement; 5 Rwanda: Failure to stop genocide; 6 Iraq: From pre-emption to counterinsurgency; 7 Iraq: Transformation failure and intervention performance; 8 Iraq: Non-support of pre-emptive war; 9 Afghanistan: From self-defense to state-building; 10 Afghanistan: Stabilization and counterinsurgency performance; 11 Afghanistan: From adequate to dwindling support
327   $a12 Legitimacy and the conditions of successNotes; Bibliography; Index
330   $aThis book examines the concept of legitimacy as it may be used to explain the success, or failure, of key stability operations since the end of the Cold War. In the success of stability operations, legitimacy is key. In order to achieve success, the intervening force must create a sense of legitimacy of the mission among the various constituencies concerned with and involved in the venture. These parties include the people of the host nation, the host government (whose relations with the local people must be legitimate), political elites and the general public worldwide-including the
410  0$aContemporary security studies.
606   $aConflict management$xInternational cooperation
606   $aArmed Forces
606   $aSecurity, International
606   $aPolitical stability
615  0$aConflict management$xInternational cooperation.
615  0$aArmed Forces.
615  0$aSecurity, International.
615  0$aPolitical stability.
676   $a327.17
700   $aAoi$b Chiyuki.$0881012
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910818131603321
996   $aLegitimacy and the use of armed force$94000903
997   $aUNINA