LEADER 03908nam 22007694a 450 001 9910818020503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-107-12163-9 010 $a1-280-43005-2 010 $a9786610430055 010 $a0-511-17581-7 010 $a0-511-04119-5 010 $a0-511-15647-2 010 $a0-511-30257-6 010 $a0-511-51035-7 010 $a0-511-04686-3 035 $a(CKB)1000000000007979 035 $a(EBL)201403 035 $a(OCoLC)191035568 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000259379 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11939525 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000259379 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10274478 035 $a(PQKB)10174445 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511510359 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC201403 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL201403 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10005038 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL43005 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000007979 100 $a20000403d2001 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aTimber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia /$fMichael L. Ross 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aCambridge, UK ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$d2001 215 $a1 online resource (xvi, 237 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 0 $a1-107-40481-9 311 0 $a0-521-79167-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 209-228). 327 $a1. Introduction: Three Puzzles -- 2. The Problem of Resource Booms -- 3. Explaining Institutional Breakdown -- 4. The Philippines: The Legal Slaughter of the Forests -- 5. Sabah, Malaysia: A New State of Affairs -- 6. Sarawak, Malaysia: An Almost Uncontrollable Instinct -- 7. Indonesia: Putting the Forests to "Better Use" -- 8. Conclusion: Rent Seeking and Rent Seizing. 330 $aScholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process. 410 0$aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions. 606 $aForest management$xEnvironmental aspects$zSoutheast Asia 606 $aForest policy$xEnvironmental aspects$zSoutheast Asia 606 $aLogging$xEconomic aspects$zSoutheast Asia 606 $aTimber$xEconomic aspects$zSoutheast Asia 606 $aRent (Economic theory) 615 0$aForest management$xEnvironmental aspects 615 0$aForest policy$xEnvironmental aspects 615 0$aLogging$xEconomic aspects 615 0$aTimber$xEconomic aspects 615 0$aRent (Economic theory) 676 $a333.75/137/0959 700 $aRoss$b Michael Lewin$f1961-$01687078 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910818020503321 996 $aTimber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia$94060277 997 $aUNINA