LEADER 05242oam 22011414 450 001 9910817529203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4623-7193-0 010 $a1-4527-6623-1 010 $a1-4518-7053-1 010 $a9786612841460 010 $a1-282-84146-7 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055097 035 $a(EBL)1608000 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943007 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11558963 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943007 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10974705 035 $a(PQKB)10045201 035 $a(OCoLC)762340647 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2008195 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608000 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2008195 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055097 100 $a20020129d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPension Privatization and Country Risk /$fAlfredo Cuevas, Maria Gonzalez, Arnoldo López-Marmolejo, Davide Lombardo 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (27 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/195 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1506-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Country Risk, Credit Ratings and Implicit Pension Debt (IPD); Figures; 1. Standard and Poor's Creidt Ratings and Government Debt; 2. Risk Premia and International Investor Ratings; III. Econometric Analysis; Tables; 1. Institutional Investor Ratings (IIR), IPD and Debt; 2. IIR and Pension Reform: Static Panel Estimation with Fixed Effects; 3. IIR and Pension Reform: Dynamic Panel (2SLS) Estimation Results; IV. A Counterfactual Study: Mexico's Pension Reform; A. Pension Privation in Mexico; B. Risk Assessment 327 $a3. Mexico: Counterfactual Explicit Debt and Primary Balance4. Estimated Impact of Pension Reform on IIR; 4. Mexico: Counterfactual IIR; V. Conclusion; VI. Annexes; References 330 3 $aThis paper explores how privatizing a pension system can affect sovereign credit risk. For this purpose, it analyzes the importance that rating agencies give to implicit pension debt (IPD) in their assessments of sovereign creditworthiness. We find that rating agencies generally do not seem to give much weight to IPD, focusing instead on explicit public debt. However, by channeling pension contributions away from the government and creating a deficit of resources to cover the current pension liabilities during the reform's transition period, a pension privatization reform may transform IPD into explicit public debt, adversely affecting a sovereign's perceived creditworthiness, thus increasing its risk premium. In this light, accompanying pension reform with efforts to offset its transition costs through fiscal adjustment would help preserve a country's credit rating. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/195 606 $aPensions$xEconometric models 606 $aPrivatization$xEconometric models 606 $aDebts, Public$xEconometric models 606 $aCountry risk$xEconometric models 606 $aCredit ratings$2imf 606 $aDebt Management$2imf 606 $aDebt$2imf 606 $aDebts, Public$2imf 606 $aLabor$2imf 606 $aMonetary economics$2imf 606 $aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General$2imf 606 $aMoney and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aNonwage Labor Costs and Benefits$2imf 606 $aPension reform$2imf 606 $aPension spending$2imf 606 $aPensions$2imf 606 $aPrivate Pensions$2imf 606 $aPublic debt$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aSocial Security and Public Pensions$2imf 606 $aSovereign Debt$2imf 607 $aMexico$2imf 615 0$aPensions$xEconometric models. 615 0$aPrivatization$xEconometric models. 615 0$aDebts, Public$xEconometric models. 615 0$aCountry risk$xEconometric models. 615 7$aCredit ratings 615 7$aDebt Management 615 7$aDebt 615 7$aDebts, Public 615 7$aLabor 615 7$aMonetary economics 615 7$aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General 615 7$aMoney and Monetary Policy 615 7$aNonwage Labor Costs and Benefits 615 7$aPension reform 615 7$aPension spending 615 7$aPensions 615 7$aPrivate Pensions 615 7$aPublic debt 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aSocial Security and Public Pensions 615 7$aSovereign Debt 676 $a331.252 700 $aCuevas$b Alfredo$01619195 701 $aGonzalez$b Maria$01642174 701 $aLombardo$b Davide$0613943 701 $aLópez-Marmolejo$b Arnoldo$01713253 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910817529203321 996 $aPension Privatization and Country Risk$94106094 997 $aUNINA