LEADER 03719nam 2200685 450 001 9910817376403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-691-11699-7 010 $a1-4008-4944-6 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400849444 035 $a(CKB)2550000001130560 035 $a(EBL)1422530 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001156036 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11624562 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001156036 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11188461 035 $a(PQKB)11086182 035 $a(OCoLC)861200196 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse37223 035 $a(DE-B1597)447462 035 $a(OCoLC)860923206 035 $a(OCoLC)979632713 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400849444 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1422530 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10782426 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL530371 035 $a(OCoLC)867925653 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1422530 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001130560 100 $a20040903h20052005 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDeterrence by diplomacy /$fAnne E. Sartori 205 $aCourse Book 210 1$aPrinceton, New Jersey :$cPrinceton University Press,$d[2005] 210 4$dİ2005 215 $a1 online resource (175 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-13400-6 311 $a1-299-99120-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [153]-160) and index. 327 $apart I. Introduction -- part II. How bluffs can hurt a state's diplomacy, and honesty provides the ability to communicate -- part III. Evidence that honesty matters -- part Ivolume Conclusion -- part volume Appendixes. 330 $aWhy are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic. Anne Sartori argues that diplomacy works precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force. So, to maintain the effectiveness of their diplomacy, states sometimes acquiesce to others' demands when they might have been able to attain their goals through bluffs. Sartori theorizes that countries obtain a "trade" of issues over time; they get their way more often when they deem the issues more important, and concede more often when they deem the issues less important. Departing from traditional theory, this book shows that rather than always fighting over small issues to show resolve, states can make their threats more credible by sometimes honestly acquiescing over lesser issues--by not crying "wolf." 606 $aDiplomacy 606 $aDeterrence (Strategy) 615 0$aDiplomacy. 615 0$aDeterrence (Strategy) 676 $a327.2 686 $a89.90$2bcl 700 $aSartori$b Anne E.$f1966-$01632791 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910817376403321 996 $aDeterrence by diplomacy$93972194 997 $aUNINA