LEADER 03237nam 22005774a 450 001 9910817287003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8157-9842-3 035 $a(CKB)111087027972520 035 $a(OCoLC)614551729 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10026231 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000272512 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11204291 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000272512 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10308920 035 $a(PQKB)10696759 035 $a(OCoLC)1132228743 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse73375 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3004301 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10026231 035 $a(OCoLC)53371734 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3004301 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111087027972520 100 $a20000425d2000 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aWinning ugly $eNATO's war to save Kosovo /$fIvo H. Daalder, Michael E. O'Hanlon 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aWashington, D.C. $cBrookings Institution Press$dc2000 215 $a1 online resource (xi, 343 pages) $cillustrations, maps 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-8157-1697-4 311 $a0-8157-1696-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 279-331) and index. 327 $aIntroduction -- The escalating crisis -- The road to war -- Losing the war -- Winning the war -- Conclusions and policy implications. 330 $a"In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by driving 1.5 million Albanians from their homes and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them." "In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win." "The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case."--Jacket 606 $aKosovo War, 1998-1999 615 0$aKosovo War, 1998-1999. 676 $a949.71 700 $aDaalder$b Ivo H$0623179 701 $aO'Hanlon$b Michael E$0552048 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910817287003321 996 $aWinning ugly$91271485 997 $aUNINA