LEADER 04640nam 2200709Ia 450 001 9910817206003321 005 20230725031000.0 010 $a0-8014-6032-8 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801460326 035 $a(CKB)2670000000081014 035 $a(EBL)3138002 035 $a(OCoLC)726824262 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000486828 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11309184 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000486828 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10449736 035 $a(PQKB)10517807 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138002 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse28739 035 $a(DE-B1597)515536 035 $a(OCoLC)1083587291 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801460326 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138002 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10457623 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000081014 100 $a20100430d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPublic law and private power$b[electronic resource] $ecorporate governance reform in the in the age of finance capitalism /$fJohn W. Cioffi 210 $aIthaca $cCornell University Press$d2010 215 $a1 online resource (301 p.) 225 1 $aCornell studies in political economy 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-8014-4904-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tCONTENTS --$tFIGURES AND TABLES --$tACKNOWLEDGMENTS --$t1. Corporate Governance Reform and the Age of Finance Capitalism --$t2. Corporate Governance as juridical Nexus and the Politics of Reform --$t3. Neoliberal Governance and the Neocorporatist Firm: Governance Models in the United States and Germany --$t4. U.S. Corporate Governance Reform: Boom, Bust, and Backlash --$t5. German Corporate Governance Reform: The Limits of Legal Transformation --$t6. Governing the Ruins: The Global Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance --$tConclusion: Legal Form and the Politics of Reform --$tReferences --$tCases --$tStatutes, Regulations, and Regulatory Materials --$tIndex 330 $aIn Public Law and Private Power, John W. Cioffi argues that the highly politicized reform of corporate governance law has reshaped power relations within the public corporation in favor of financial interests, contributed to the profound crises of contemporary capitalism, and eroded its political foundations. Analyzing the origins of pro-shareholder and pro-financial market reforms in the United States and Germany during the past two decades, Cioffi unravels a double paradox: the expansion of law and the regulatory state at the core of the financially driven neoliberal economic model and the surprising role of Center Left parties in championing the interests of shareholders and the financial sector. Since the early 1990's, changes in law to alter the structure of the corporation and financial markets-two institutional pillars of modern capitalism-highlight the contentious regulatory politics that reshaped the legal architecture of national corporate governance regimes and thus the distribution of power and wealth among managers, investors, and labor. Center Left parties embraced reforms that strengthened shareholder rights as part of a strategy to cultivate the support of the financial sector, promote market-driven firm-level economic adjustment, and appeal to popular outrage over recurrent corporate financial scandals. The reforms played a role in fostering an increasingly unstable financially driven economic order; their implication in the global financial crisis in turn poses a threat to center-left parties and the legitimacy of contemporary finance capitalism. 410 0$aCornell studies in political economy. 606 $aCorporate governance$xPolitical aspects$zUnited States 606 $aCorporate governance$xPolitical aspects$zGermany 606 $aCorporate governance$xLaw and legislation$zUnited States 606 $aCorporate governance$xLaw and legislation$zGermany 606 $aInternational finance 606 $aFinancial crises 615 0$aCorporate governance$xPolitical aspects 615 0$aCorporate governance$xPolitical aspects 615 0$aCorporate governance$xLaw and legislation 615 0$aCorporate governance$xLaw and legislation 615 0$aInternational finance. 615 0$aFinancial crises. 676 $a338.60943 700 $aCioffi$b John W$0514864 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910817206003321 996 $aPublic law and private power$9851032 997 $aUNINA