LEADER 04410nam 2200697Ia 450 001 9910817055803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-231-50568-X 024 7 $a10.7312/mare11186 035 $a(CKB)111056485386922 035 $a(EBL)909285 035 $a(OCoLC)818856949 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000267629 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12068419 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000267629 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10227122 035 $a(PQKB)11360197 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000774814 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12335228 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000774814 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10728144 035 $a(PQKB)23142602 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC909285 035 $a(DE-B1597)459095 035 $a(OCoLC)51574558 035 $a(OCoLC)979742068 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780231505680 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL909285 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10619687 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL690469 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111056485386922 100 $a20000831d2001 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aViolent peace$b[electronic resource] $emilitarized interstate bargaining in Latin America /$fDavid R. Mares 210 $aNew York $cColumbia University Press$d2001 215 $a1 online resource (319 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-231-11187-8 311 $a0-231-11186-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [263]-285) and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface. Interstate Competition in a Heterogeneous World: The Importance of Understanding Violent Peace -- $tPart 1. The Issue -- $t1. The Origins of Violent Peace: Explaining the Use of Force in Foreign Policy -- $t2. Latin America's Violent Peace -- $tPart 2. Analyzing Latin America's Violent Peace -- $t3. The Myth of Hegemonic Management -- $t4. Democracy, Restrained Leadership and the Use of Military Force -- $t5. The Distribution of Power and Military Conflict -- $t6. Military Leadership and the Use of Force: Illustrations from the Beagle Channel Dispute -- $t7. Democracies and the Use of Force: Suggestions from the Ecuador- Peru Dispute -- $tPart 3. Conclusion -- $t8. Militarized Bargaining in Latin America: Prospects for Diminishing Its Use -- $tAppendix -- $tNotes -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aWhen is military force an acceptable tool of foreign policy? Why do democracies use force against each other? David R. Mares argues that the key factors influencing political leaders in all types of polities are the costs to their constituencies of using force and whether the leader can survive their displeasure if the costs exceed what they are willing to pay. Violent Peace proposes a conceptual scheme for analyzing militarized conflict and supports this framework with evidence from the history of Latin America. His model has greater explanatory power when applied to this conflict-ridden region than a model emphasizing U.S. power, levels of democracy, or the balance of power.Mares takes conflict as a given in international relations but does not believe that large-scale violence must inevitably result, arguing that it is the management of conflict, and not necessarily its resolution, that should be the focus of students, scholars, and practitioners of international relations. Mares argues that deterrence represents the key to conflict management by directly affecting the costs of using force. Conflicts escalate to violence when leaders ignore the requisites for credible and ongoing deterrence. Successful deterrence, he suggests, lies in a strategy that combines diplomatic and military incentives, allowing competition among heterogenous states to be managed in a way that minimizes conflict and maximizes cooperation. 606 $aConflict management$zLatin America 606 $aPacific settlement of international disputes 607 $aLatin America$xForeign relations 607 $aLatin America$xMilitary policy 615 0$aConflict management 615 0$aPacific settlement of international disputes. 676 $a327.8 700 $aMares$b David R$0596021 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910817055803321 996 $aViolent peace$94126174 997 $aUNINA