LEADER 04098nam 22007452 450 001 9910816612303321 005 20151005020623.0 010 $a1-107-46188-X 010 $a1-139-89349-1 010 $a1-107-45972-9 010 $a1-316-60933-2 010 $a1-107-46539-7 010 $a1-107-47254-7 010 $a1-107-46894-9 010 $a1-107-32378-9 010 $a1-107-47352-7 035 $a(CKB)2550000001138816 035 $a(EBL)1543586 035 $a(OCoLC)859536520 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000985429 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12437989 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000985429 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10945597 035 $a(PQKB)11442517 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781107323780 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1543586 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10774122 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL538486 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1543586 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001138816 100 $a20130118d2013|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aFreedom, repression, and private property in Russia /$fVladimir Shlapentokh, Michigan State University, Anna Arutunyan, Independent journalist 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2013. 215 $a1 online resource (vii, 208 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-04214-3 311 $a1-306-07235-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aPrivate property and big money in political regimes in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia: a theoretical overview -- Ideology and public opinion in a centralized society and in a fragmented society -- Corruption, the power of state and big business in the Soviet and post-Soviet regimes -- Enemies and the issue of legitimization in the Soviet and post-Soviet regimes -- Political police before and after -- Treatment of strikers in Soviet and post-Soviet times: Novocherkassk and Mezhdurechensk -- Foreign policy: the geopolitical factor before and money after -- A freedom which Putin dearly loves -- "the right to leave his country." 330 $aThis study demonstrates how the emergence of private property and a market economy after the Soviet Union's collapse enabled a degree of freedom while simultaneously supporting authoritarianism. Based on case studies, Vladimir Shlapentokh and Anna Arutunyan analyze how private property and free markets spawn feudal elements in society. These elements are so strong in post-Communist Russia that they prevent the formation of a true democratic society, while making it impossible to return to totalitarianism. The authors describe the resulting Russian society as having three types of social organization: authoritarian, feudal and liberal. The authors examine the adaptation of Soviet-era institutions like security forces, the police and the army to free market conditions and how they generated corruption; the belief that the KGB was relatively free from corruption; how large property holdings merge with power and necessitate repression; and how property relations affect government management and suppression. 517 3 $aFreedom, Repression, & Private Property in Russia 606 $aDemocracy$zRussia (Federation) 606 $aCivil rights$zRussia (Federation) 606 $aProperty$xPolitical aspects$zRussia (Federation) 606 $aFree enterprise$xPolitical aspects$zRussia (Federation) 607 $aRussia (Federation)$xPolitics and government$y1991- 615 0$aDemocracy 615 0$aCivil rights 615 0$aProperty$xPolitical aspects 615 0$aFree enterprise$xPolitical aspects 676 $a947.086 700 $aShlapentokh$b Vladimir$0675978 702 $aArutunyan$b Anna 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910816612303321 996 $aFreedom, repression, and private property in Russia$94095867 997 $aUNINA