LEADER 03257nam 2200637 a 450 001 9910815571303321 005 20230124184421.0 010 $a0-8047-7715-2 024 7 $a10.1515/9780804777155 035 $a(CKB)2560000000072236 035 $a(EBL)683265 035 $a(OCoLC)714569452 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC683265 035 $a(DE-B1597)564648 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780804777155 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL683265 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10459573 035 $a(OCoLC)1198930590 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000072236 100 $a20101021d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aOn flexibility $erecovery from technological and doctrinal surprise on the battlefield /$fMeir Finkel ; translated by Moshe Tlamim 210 $aStanford, Ca $cStanford Security Studies$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (337 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 1 $a0-8047-7488-9 311 1 $a0-8047-7489-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aPrediction and intelligence : the dominant approach in force planning and its failure to answer the challenge of technological and doctrinal surprise -- Conceptual and doctrinal flexibility -- Organizational and technological flexibility -- Cognitive and command and control (C2) flexibility -- The mechanism for lesson learning and rapid dissemination -- The German recovery from the surprise of British chaff -- The German recovery from the Soviet T-34 tank surprise -- The Israeli recovery from the Egyptian Sagger missile surprise -- The Israeli air force recovery from the Arab anti-aircraft missile surprise -- The slow British recovery from the German armor and anti-tank tactics -- The slow Soviet recovery from the surprise of low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan -- The French failure to recover from the surprise of the German blitzkrieg. 330 $aThis book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises-ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines? Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm-with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities-generally doesn't work. 606 $aMilitary readiness 606 $aMilitary doctrine 606 $aMilitary art and science 606 $aSurprise (Military science) 606 $aMilitary history, Modern$y20th century 606 $aTechnology$xMilitary aspects 615 0$aMilitary readiness. 615 0$aMilitary doctrine. 615 0$aMilitary art and science. 615 0$aSurprise (Military science) 615 0$aMilitary history, Modern 615 0$aTechnology$xMilitary aspects. 676 $a355.02 700 $aFinkel$b Meir$f1968-$01635151 701 $aTlamim$b Moshe$01635152 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910815571303321 996 $aOn flexibility$93975775 997 $aUNINA