LEADER 05420oam 22012734 450 001 9910814669903321 005 20240410162754.0 010 $a1-4623-9722-0 010 $a1-4519-9339-0 010 $a1-282-47425-1 010 $a1-4527-0241-1 010 $a9786613821782 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443216 035 $a(EBL)3014487 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940715 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11571962 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940715 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10956074 035 $a(PQKB)11782171 035 $a(OCoLC)694141168 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006146 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014487 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443216 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhat Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : $eAn Analysis of Rent Capture /$fElisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (35 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"June 2006." 311 $a1-4518-6406-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aThis paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/146 606 $aCorruption$zDeveloping countries$xPrevention$xEconometric models 606 $aRent (Economic theory)$xEconometric models 606 $aTransparency in government$xEconometric models 606 $aLabor$2imf 606 $aTaxation$2imf 606 $aCriminology$2imf 606 $aDemography$2imf 606 $aBureaucracy$2imf 606 $aAdministrative Processes in Public Organizations$2imf 606 $aCorruption$2imf 606 $aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General$2imf 606 $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf 606 $aEmployment$2imf 606 $aUnemployment$2imf 606 $aWages$2imf 606 $aIntergenerational Income Distribution$2imf 606 $aAggregate Human Capital$2imf 606 $aAggregate Labor Productivity$2imf 606 $aDemographic Economics: General$2imf 606 $aCorporate crime$2imf 606 $awhite-collar crime$2imf 606 $aLabour$2imf 606 $aincome economics$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aCivil service & public sector$2imf 606 $aPopulation & demography$2imf 606 $aTax incentives$2imf 606 $aCivil service$2imf 606 $aPopulation and demographics$2imf 606 $aPopulation$2imf 607 $aBolivia$2imf 615 0$aCorruption$xPrevention$xEconometric models. 615 0$aRent (Economic theory)$xEconometric models. 615 0$aTransparency in government$xEconometric models. 615 7$aLabor 615 7$aTaxation 615 7$aCriminology 615 7$aDemography 615 7$aBureaucracy 615 7$aAdministrative Processes in Public Organizations 615 7$aCorruption 615 7$aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General 615 7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General 615 7$aEmployment 615 7$aUnemployment 615 7$aWages 615 7$aIntergenerational Income Distribution 615 7$aAggregate Human Capital 615 7$aAggregate Labor Productivity 615 7$aDemographic Economics: General 615 7$aCorporate crime 615 7$awhite-collar crime 615 7$aLabour 615 7$aincome economics 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aCivil service & public sector 615 7$aPopulation & demography 615 7$aTax incentives 615 7$aCivil service 615 7$aPopulation and demographics 615 7$aPopulation 700 $aPaul$b Elisabeth$0907258 701 $aDabla-Norris$b Era$01609994 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bMiddle East and Central Asia Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910814669903321 996 $aWhat Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail$94098570 997 $aUNINA