LEADER 04291nam 22007572 450 001 9910814449203321 005 20151005020621.0 010 $a1-316-08981-9 010 $a1-139-57953-3 010 $a1-283-63766-9 010 $a1-139-57005-6 010 $a1-107-25444-2 010 $a1-139-57271-7 010 $a1-139-10855-7 010 $a1-139-56915-5 010 $a1-139-57096-X 035 $a(CKB)2670000000261210 035 $a(EBL)1025045 035 $a(OCoLC)815389321 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000722739 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11464737 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000722739 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10697122 035 $a(PQKB)10744978 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1025045 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139108553 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1025045 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10608420 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL395012 035 $a(OCoLC)820833256 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000261210 100 $a20141103d2012|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aMultiethnic coalitions in Africa $ebusiness financing of opposition election campaigns /$fLeonardo R. Arriola$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (xvii, 304 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge studies in comparative politics 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-60543-1 311 $a1-107-02111-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aThe puzzle of opposition coordination -- A theory of pecuniary coalition formation -- The emergence of financial reprisal regimes -- The political control of banking -- The liberalization of capital -- The political alignment of business -- Opposition bargaining across ethnic cleavages -- Multiethnic opposition coalitions in African elections -- Democratic consolidation in Africa -- Appendix A: Commercial banking sector size and opposition coalitions in Africa -- Appendix B: Sources on commodity exports and ethnic production by country -- Appendix C: Variables: definitions, sources, and summary statistics -- Appendix D: Multiethnic opposition coalitions in Africa, 1990-2005. 330 $aWhy are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals. 410 0$aCambridge studies in comparative politics. 606 $aOpposition (Political science)$zAfrica, Sub-Saharan 606 $aElectoral coalitions$zAfrica, Sub-Saharan 606 $aCampaign funds$zAfrica, Sub-Saharan 607 $aAfrica, Sub-Saharan$xEthnic relations$xPolitical aspects 607 $aAfrica, Sub-Saharan$xPolitics and government$y1960- 607 $aKenya$xPolitics and government 607 $aCameroon$xPolitics and government 615 0$aOpposition (Political science) 615 0$aElectoral coalitions 615 0$aCampaign funds 676 $a324.70967 700 $aArriola$b Leonardo R$g(Leonardo Rafael),$01694684 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910814449203321 996 $aMultiethnic coalitions in Africa$94073382 997 $aUNINA